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International relation• prior to 1900 had been lf.aitad to the con•
tinenta of lurope and America.

!urope in particular had controlled Aaia

and Africa, making them aubeervient and wholly dependent politically,
economically, and aocially to it.

Thia waa ..de poaaible by a mutual

underatancliq between the dominant powara.

However, after World War II,

The Third World, coapriaiq thoae n.atiOGa created after 1945, baa achieved
a proainent place in international relation•.

lt haa penetrated world

politica.
Thia analyaia i• not a atudy of the Third World, but rather it
will be an analyaia of the balance of power politic• iD relatiooa to
ailitary interveation.

It will center it• atud7 in the Y...n conflict,

which atarted in 26 September 1962, and in which it had it• root• dating
before that.

The aurvey will concentrate on the Civil War in Yemen,

••••••ina the Egyptian and Saudi Arabian iuvolv...ata in the diepute, aod
..aauring

the effect it haa hacl on their relation• aa well •• on the

balance of power in the Middle Eaat.

Further, it will apeculate on the

effect the conflict haa had in ariaing the intereat,
of the big powere.

negative or poaitive,

It will esaaine how the political and military •tale•

mate between the tvo Super Powers haa altered world politic• la regard•
ailitary intervention.

Military iatenention vaa at one tille at the di•·

poeal of the bi& povera. who enjoyed it, and at tlaea, practiced it 1ndia•
crillinately.

11

The atudy 1• belDg unclertakem prillarlly becauae th•

1- baa, 11e>re or l•••• been ipored by the world.
about it.

It 1• vital that 110r• 11\fomatioo be

Y...n prob•

Little baa bea vrittn

Md•

kDown, becaua• tb•

Yellell Civil War could offer, due to it• uniqueneaa, a helpful guide to a
better UDderataadtaa oi the probl... aD4I perapectl•ea..• of developiaa
..tioae in the field of iDtenaational relatioaa.
•711P•thatic.

To uaderetand 1• to be

Tlaia vol'k la betas uadertakeD vitb a a,.,atbati� approach,

hoping that auch

aa UMl...or vlll aot avail ltaelf to blaa.

111
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C H A P T ER I
I N T R O DUC T IO N

The md

of World War II vitueaaed the &•e.ala of a

,pawelt', ••••tially differ•t from

aeao•

to

of

a d•alre b1 aoverelpa atate• at

pl'ev•tiq 4-.lution of the 1DternatioDa1 ayet•

al.moat equal

t.alanc.

th• luropean claaalcal balaDce of power.

Crudely apeakiaa, bal.aac• of power

claaalcal �laace

n•

by ay

OD•

The

atata.l

of pow.er •1•t.. vaa divided betveea five aatioaa,

..ch

other ta allitazy aDCl ecODOllic atr...tba

1n alllaacea, coalf.t1ou, alMI even vera.

fl'\&aala,

lt belpM 1D pr
..esatiaa any OD•

natiOD fwca bacoaba,a 4••nant.

Tb• poet 1945 ulae• of paver •1•t• 1• ••••tlally betvMD
auperpoweraz

the Ualted

ltatu .., the Soviet 1Jaioa.

Al l other balauce

of powe·r ayat.. today are priMrily "inferior''

&1MI reatoaal.

caribbeu, a South E••t

A91M, a hl'k

for ample, aa Arab, •

Balkan balaee of power•

Th•r• are,

aad a

the Mjor b•J.allce of paver la batveea two co&U.•

tiou, the lorth At.:lantic Tr..e1 Or&anisatloa llBd the WarHV Pact.
a ltlpolar
tl\elr

ova

two

It

1•

cli.•i•loa of 'PO'f•r 1D wlch l>otb coal1tlolw are domiuted by
Such a ltipolar 411Yi•ioa of power "lacr...••

reapectl•• auperpowr.

iatenaat'-81 t..lOD

laterut&oel

_.the ,.••hility of var.

11...n

W1tbout tile ahlftlq and

•it.el&, ''OU lalwe of fowe.- IJ•t•,0
M&•lt•• "(1960), pp. 9·10.

i

JO!Dfl .21

2
counterehifting of position•, there is leea need for intra•and inter•
alliance eompromiee."2

It also make• it easier for the auperpower• to

control their allies, 1ince the allie• are dependaat on thea.

Therefore,

it reducee the chance for the alliea to coerce their aenior partners into
coaproaia1ng their position• vben they deem it neceaaary for the aainte•
nance of peace.

Thie examination will atudy the balance of power in the middle
Katt between the traditioualiat and the progreaaive Arab govermae11t• in
their confrontation in Yeaea.

The paper will ex•ir&e the Yemeni dileiaa

froa 1962 to 1969 and analyse the ttruggle for power between the oppoaiug
forces.

However, before the exaaiaation begin•, it 1• proper to reflect

upc;m the preaeat day world in order that a better underatanding of the
confliet in Yemen may be accompliahed.
Power politic• ia the relation• between atate.
iute1'D&tional.3

It, thua, means

Indepen.dent state• come into conflict with other•, and by

i

so dolq they inad'verteotly p ay the "power gaae."4

The participant• want

to •tad cloaely with their fr1•Dd•, but above all they want to •intain a
favorable power poaition GYer their likely rival.

It 1• every nation's

aspiration to work for lt• eel! lntereat, and if it• intereat is
endangered by another state, then a conflict, either ailitary, econoaic, or

2Joba lpalur, World Politic•

(Kew Yorks

.!! !! Al! .2! gevolution,

Frederick A. Pr••a•r, 1967), p.

Sl.

l

3Ala J-•· "Power Politic," Politica

1964)

•

p.

30 7 .

4l!.t!!!.

•

,

•

308

•

Studies, (�tober,

3

political or all
aovereignty

ae

three, enavee.

"Every natioQ, to the atent tllat ita

au• anythiAg at all, aaeka to aaiotain 1t1 freedoa of

actioa for itae1f ila matter• affecting it• vital

intereat. n$

of tatea:aatioaal politie• ia the struggle for pow• r .

lt 1•

The

ee•ene•

of ne4eaaity

power polttica. 6
The

world flully

trrattoaality.

t1oo

after World Var

ef

Cold

aad

War,

the At.oaic ltlllb

eound barrier.
,.•• ild.-.

au�•

11

tb.at war

ia aa

Thia rulintien waa 801'• eevei-•11 telt after 1945 becauee

aad aophiaticatioa o f ailitary equiflNut.

explo•tou

hie

i-uliaed

caaa

fa ce to

•1th hocnr arad 11••• an

face· with.-at.ealle• capable

�•e •veat• beightaae4
The Cold

qatut

Re vitaeaaecl the

Val'

th• birth of tbe

of ltreakina the

hia aatoniabaea.t

caat

u • i&aUi

aza4 increased

tn that it pitted the two

eacll other.

The po•••••ioD

of

atael.Mr W&J"b.U. Mk••

tecbaolo11 critical.lT .�,.. the lledalitie•

dir••tlv· affect• tbe ch•ac•• •f

oi

..t.a&etata1

temporary ailitary advaatage to acbine

JIOU

it illper-ative for the

tbe pr••eat a7atem aacl

1Dternatloaal atab il1ty

peraanent and favorable

"Morality and lfational Pavet 1n International
&eyiew: ti· f• lk ic• , (Jawary, 1964), p. 34.

5theodore Weber,

PoU.tic:•,

"

• • •

'a.a.

•qeath8't.

A. IDopf, ltSS),

p.

31.

lt11ti!! M!M!!ti.oil•,

(law 'forki

Alfred

4
diatrlbution of power without riaking unpr..:edented and prohibitive aelf·
4eatructioa.u7

Strategie• in a nuclear war would be almoat ..utngleaa.

Therefore, tbe atability of dete1Tence between the Uaited State• aad the
Soviet Union ia the atab11ity of the world.

The reaaoD interaatioaal

stability i• ao much influenced by nuclear weapon• ia due to the aveaome
deatructiYe P'ft'•r of nuclear am.a and the 0uabeU.evably compr•••ed tilDa
in vhich auch deatructioa would take place.

Moreover, no country wherever

located and however atroaa ailitarily can, under current lllld foreaeeable
circuaatancea, realiatically believe itaelf imaune froa the power and
reach of nuclear weapou."8

It bae b&ea roughly eatimated that a third

world var would annihila
. te JOO million Chineae, lSO ailU.oo Americana,
and betweeo 100 and 150 ailU.on auaaiana.

Such deetructiv••••• or the

threat of it ha• illpoae4 a a• balance.9

loDe of the nperpovera haa a

tnmp card over the other, &1Ml both are vulnerable to def.enalve aecondary atrill••·

Becauae both poa•••• the capabllitiea to atrike back, they

bne a maclear parity or ataU...te.

The reaU.aatioa of thi• pheacmeaoo

haa forced th- to adopt the policy of ,.acefv.l coaiatence, or peacef\11
competition over the aeutral world aDCl ecODOlli c rivalry.
e••ace ba1 beca11e

aa

ideoloatcal and ecoaoaic coaflict.

The Cold War in
Many analyats

71. Zoppo, "ltuclear Technology, Mlltipolarity, and International
Stability," World Politic•. (July, 1966), p. S90.
8lbtd • • ,. sao.
Journal

&

90lema Snycler, "lalance of Power in the Miaaile Age,"
Interpatioul Affairs, (1960), p. 21.

s

militarily, will tend to

eacourage

the creatiou of a kind of high-level

etrategic umbrella, reducina the likelihood of large•acale aeneral war•
fare and, therefore, makina.the iaternatioaal areaa ••fer for varioua
kiu41 of l••••r varfare.

10

Thia aeane tvo thin1•1

caa UD4ertake military adveature• on a

...11

(1), the �i& powers

acale, aot directly coatag

into contact with the vital iatereat of the other bis pc:nrer1 and,

(2), it

'8pl1ea that third•rate nation• can expert.ent with ailitary lnterTention
of their

CND

wtth tbt bl•••ina and/or condemnation of one of the big

povera.
While a atate of peaceful coexiatence i• the pr�vailina code
between the CO"W'miat and capitaliat c-.pa, it a-.erth•l••• i• influenced
by the tr...nd<>ua tapaot of the appearance of a "third world."ll

the

third world coaprieea tboee nation• pr..ioualy under coloaial control who
bne ••t•r•d the iaternation.al acen•.- .. They h•v• l>roupt

vith tbea the

idea that the "new icleoloaical atruaale haa tranafonaecl contemporary
f.Dteratate relation• lato • total pol1tic•l•llDral coafli�t."1 2

MoreoYer,

they waat to uvance ·t1'eil" aatiOll9 eeea•£cally, while at the .... time
•teerina clear of

ia.ol•....t• with the two 8\lperpovans.

Th• 4eYelopiDI c.watrt•• � to.�e fr.. to decide fo� t1' ...•l•••

what aery.- tha i•tere•t of their people, but caaaot 4o 10 if
they beeome i4eatf.fi.. wt.th polki..a. 11buh, la tbe it •in. ddeat
the real.iaation of tbia purpoae.
That ie why they exploit.. the
.

1 0.elmut Schai4t, l•f•!!!
1962), pp. 207-208.
llMario

Co • • lnc •

•

ll !,etaU.atio!, (In TKk:

loaai, Ih.! Tbid World, (Jllew Tork:
p. 4.

1963),

Praeger.

funk aad Wapala,

l2Joha Spanier. World folitica _!!! .!! §! � R•Yolution, p. 196.

6

rlvalriea between the power• while refuaina to take eica.ai
they ex p loit the cold war while refuaing to become participants
111 1t. 13
The third vorl4 waut• •coua.ic 6aaiatacee fraa the 4eveloped aatioa s ,but
they aleo ••••rt that they want it with no •trina• attached.

Their

apyreheaeiona over colouial181D aakea thea aa eatier taraet for comauniat
acroacbmeut.

Ghana

However, thia is not entirely the caae.

have depoaed pro-co•muaiat reata.a.

and Indoneaia

Th•y �ecome iadi&D&Q.t over big power

ailitary iaterweatioa in the iaternal affair• of a ... 11er nation.

lut

their voices are aometiae• very low, •• waa the caae during luaaia'a 1968
ailitary intervention ia the internal affaire of CaechoalOT&kia. •••dle••
to aay, the third world r.aiaa •• a 110ral fo.-ce &Def partial deterrent to
bia paver clu4natine io.curaiou.
While it may appear that the areat power• moat frequently promote
au-veraion and elandeaatilae operation• abroad or direct outriaht
interventi0111, thi• iapreaaiou 1• not e011pletely accurate.
are draaati•ed vben they occur.

TIU•, they

However, aaaller aationa have al•o used

theae technique• to achie.e or proaote political valuea.

Some aaall

utioaa, due to their cliel1ke for coloui& iea, h•• •upported liberation
llO'f...at e in.order to 4rive the fore•• �f reaction aD4 iaperiali•• out
oif their re.ion.

�lg.x:J.a... �ea a• aa illuatratloll.

In it• fiaht for

independence, it ha4 the aaai..at&n.ce and euptort of it• neighbor•, Tuniaia
and Morocco.
nationa.

It aleo received ailitary

�1'911

froa lgypt and other Arab

Morocco baa been eetive in or1aniain1 auerrilla activitie• in

MauritADi& and ••iallborina Spaniab Sahara, an4 up until Prader len l•lla's

1Jx.rio R.oaai,

.22.:.

c!t. , p. 77.

7
d.U.ee, the Algeriau aoveramen t ••rved •• the ceuter iD Africa for
ftuaactaa. oraaniaing.

an4

tniDing foreian utional• in the

technique• of clandeetine political action, aulrveraion, and guerrilla
Cuba, in the Americ.an h.ai•phere, vae uportilag rnolutioue

warfare.

an4

claude•tine political aad ail1tary action• to Central

and

South

America.
Noderniaation in the uoderdeveloped area of the world ha•
become a reality.

In the Kiddle Baet it ha• revolutionised the thinking

and behavior of the people

and

ha• set up two cooflicting ideologiee.

The traditional vay of llfe 1• rapidly, bowever,reluctantly, giving way
to llOderniaation.

The barl'ler1 that culturally eel educationally had

previou•ly 1eparated the lliddle iast from the reet of the world hava beeu
proar•••ively breakiaa down.

The revolutionaries, headed by Egypt, have

swung the balance of power between the traditionaliat and progre.. ive
•leacnt1 Lil the area in favor of the ao4et'Diser.

Due to tbie development,

the di•i•iou of 1tate a:a4 aociety baa beea &¢ca11pllehed in some area•.
Thi• dtvi•ion i• COllf&raDl• to the divi•ion of Church aa4 State in the
W•at.

Th• function of the atate which wae narrow an4 lnvolvecl prlmarily

defen•e

ea4

legal la•titvtioa•• ,.rforaed avch other ftauctioo as th•

individual dea&Dded.
poeaible.

The revelvtiou ia Ymea in fact •d• tbe diviaiou

Since K31pt va• the progt•••i•• leader ta the Arab world. it

•ought to aid the Y emeni levolutiooariee attain euch a division.
Since the IU4dle laetera countriea want to puraue their objective•,
they u•u•lly turn to one or 'oth of the big povera for ••sietance.

It

baa becoae cuatomary for the revolutionarie• to befriend the Soviet Union
and tile traditionali•ts the United States.

Such a development began to

8
take •ha,. •• early

u

195S.

leedle•• to aay, Egypt, which ta believed

to be the apoke llllall for the Arab r_,,olutionarie•• conaidera the United
State• too often iD league with the force• of iaperiali•• and neo•
coloolali...

To the Egyptian thi• aeana that the United Statea will not

aeek to create a Middle Eaat empire, but, rather, it ia too cloaely
aaaociated with the lritiab and reactionary Arab regiaea.

Jy reactionary,

the Egyptian mean1 the monarchiea of the area and the goveroment• which he
claiae do not repreaeut popular conaent or the interest of the people.

Re

araue• that these regillea are baaed upon an economic and political elite
vho keep power against the beet interest• of the coaaon ••••e• by co•
operating with the foreign power• having a atake in the country.15

He

cltea, for .example. the Western economic interest• iQ the oil producing
cOUDtriea la the MicWle laat.

Foreign economic intereata only hinder• the

political daci•iooa of the respective govermaenta. hence, making thoae
govermaeota dependent upon foreign capital.
i•

conduci••

Thie, the Egyptian reiterate•,

to the political elite becau•e it abets thea in maintaining

their econoaic• •octal� aad political interest•, and therefore in making
p-roare•• and 1104'en1-U.oa atatic.

tevolutioni• ha• becoee an" ideology

that incoTporate• an cwer•all world view

•ad

provide• a baaia for change.1116

lt b nat'toaali•tic, aatihierarehic, &ad aociaU.•tlc.

The Y ...nt Ci•il

War ha• focuaed on the differencea between progreaaivee and conaervatt•e•
in the Ara� worl•.
Egypt aDd Saudi Arabia have frequelltly utilised propaganda agaioat
foreigD audience• in their efforta to unde�ine aupport for Middle laatern

p.

286.

l.S,rohn s. Baden, "USA and UAR," Foreign Affair•• (January,
1965),

i;!c•
pi •
�

16Adbul Said•
Prentice-Ball• Inc., t

•

•

!!taruational
of
Tf�.

Politics, (Kev York:

9

�eglae•.

They have fiuaoced and oraaniaed aeaaaelnatioc plot•• aad

have bribed official• in neighborlua countriea.

ror approximately •llt

year•• they have beet:a engaged ailitarily iD the aff•ir• of Y...n. of
which more will be said.

The•e ....,lea illuatrate the tenaiona iu

the third world aad invoke th• lil>eral and flexible polic1ea of the
auperpowen in permitting eucb overture• by aaall natiou.

Thi• i• not

to iaply that the ••perpovera are indifferent to th••• ..all•power behavior.
but rather 'o eay that it ia the "balauc• of t.error0 or deterrence which
force• t.hea to perait au¢h actiona.

A• ve have ••en• •oth the United

17

State• and the Sovi•t Union have a veeted iutereat in avoiding war.

The

big povere do. hGWever. reetrain eaaller natioa• fl'Oll reaort�a to vio•
lence vbeneve� poeaibl�. or '4\eueve� their influence 1• etroog enough to
prnail.

OD iine other hand. bla ad.

vara of proxy.

...11

povera have bquu to utilise

Significantly, tne Algerian revolt vaa aimad at expalling

the Prench hegemony from Algeria.

Sa.all nation• who undertake to fight

ware by proxy uaually h.ve the approval from one of the euperpowera.
Bgypt haa the •t•ped approval of the Ussa to enter th• Yeaen conflict
on the aide of the Rep\lblican Ytimeniae.

Bence, while th• lapubllcan• are

Egypt'• proxy, �gypt serve• aa the Soviet Union'• proxy.
Proxy ware break out when the balance of power in a region ia in
danger of breaking down.

The Paki1tani•lndian War of 1965 vaa the reault

of the belief held by Pakiatan that the regional balance of power in that
area had been 1erioualy upaet due to the military aid India received from
both the Soviet Union and the United States after the Sino�soviet conflict

�·•I>•

17

217.

10

of 1962.

When the Imaa of Yemen vaa ousted, Saudi Arabia fearecl that

the balance of power in th• area might shift in favor of the revolution
ariea.

Thi• fear bee... a reality :wt.en Egypt came to the aid of the

lapublic. awl Saudi Araaia vaa therefore compelled to enter the conflict
by aidf.Da and aupportiag the Itoyaliat reeiatence.

The big powerg did not

eater the Yeaen1 conflict becauaa they feared it might eacalate to the
nuclear level and alao becauae they probably believed that tbe coet would
have outweighed the benefit.
allowing Saucli Arabia

and

Hence. they etayed ill the background.

E&YPt, their reapective proxiea. to carry the

burden of the war.
In the riext aeveral chapter•, thia examination will atudy the
Yemeui Civil War in liaht of the balance of power between the tradition
aliata and the proareaaivieta ill the area.

C B A P T ER

OR IG IN S OF TH E

11

CONT ROVERSY

Origins of the Controverey

The September 26, 1962, Yemeni military coup ended the more
than one•th�eaDd year old Imaaate rule of Yeaen.

The lllam la both

head of •tate and religtoua l..der of hi• people.

for two hun4red years,

the lllaaa ha' atruggled againat the Turk1· and 1t waa only ahortly
World War I, mad

..

before

a reault of the ••cee•al\11 ettorta of· the buaa Yabya

lbn Baa14•al•Din to liberate hi• country, that the OttOll&a 111ptwe f in ally

hlaa tabya,. vho•• reip la •••enc• bega tn 1918, '-vot••
biaaelt to four priacipl••t

the reatoration of iateraal order which had

collapae4 altoaether 4uriaa the era of Turkl ah ctoaiaatlon; the building

u p of the tJea 1ury 1 keeptq fol'•ipera out& aacl kytaa aurplua World
War

l

veapoo•• which were either sold to the lthiopiaa ia the lt30•• or

•l•• were etorod in cavea.l

We eucce aafullJ acht•••d all four pollclea.

The 1eo1raphic locatie>n of t...sa

..de

hi• ,.1ic1 of taolatioDlam poeeible.

for ....,,., the coaatal water• of the ae4 I•• are ehallov and full of
treacherou• r ..f a, ao4 ther• vaa
conatructlve port in T-.a.
ageDta ia di agu tae.

ao

algnlfi c ..t or apt�y te-..cl

To Jua t&hya, "all aoa•Arab•

v.re

lritiah

le fearM that !Dgl&IMI tat..... to ._.. r- jv.at

•• eh• bu amaexM AcleD ia 183t."2

att-.pt to llOdemiae Y.....

Durt.aa hia r.&.p there•••

ao ..Jor

In 1948• he vaa uaualnat.. ltJ Ab4ullah

al•Waair'• follower•, vho wanted to rid th...elvea of
Dyaa at7 aad replace it with the al•Waalra.

tbe a.d.d ••l•Din

!be coup vaa • failure.

1stauto Oule ecu, "the War and the 11aradh Conference," Review of

n!!!··

Politica v. JXVIII, (July, 1966), p. 319.
�
p. 319.
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Crown Prince Ahmed defeated the revolutioaari•• 81ld had th.. behea4ed,
including their leader al•Wa•ir.
Ahmecl �.e... kieg 1D 1948.

lie 1oat1tute4 e•rtaia ainor pro•

an••i•• reforma, by ukiq tleala with th• A8artc..., lll••iaoa, m4
Cc

mi•t Chine•• to help hi• IMHlernise Y--1.

To tile ._rtcaa•, be

IT•oted the ftrat oil UMl aiaeral cooeeaeioa YtmaD ha• .a4le to a
foreiga eoo�el'D.

H• •iaa•' a trade treaty with Ch• a..tet Uaiea, vhoae

acwe nmeat froaiaed to build factod.ee ia Y...n and to ai.e it technical
•••i•t•noe.

Ii• ••• 111Jhume4 •l·lur, after tou�loa lu�, Aata, aad

Africa, fiaall1 concl\Mled

aa

•1re ...ot vtt� t�• Cl

111iat c:llill••• which

arante4 T...• a loan of •16,SI0,000 for a teu•1••r per1o4.

Iu 1961,

1-uild a read froa 8o41d.ab to Sana.

aa

Thay were to

-..r1c:an film vaa graoted

ao oppoTtunlty to build a road froa Tats, the •out"•ru capital of teaeu.,
If acc-..pli1he4 tbl• would liell the three ..jor citi•• by paved

to Sana.
roa4.

Th• lu•i•u• tn the

.
..
....u

h.H bepm ltuildiag th• fort o!

aodeidah, equipped with 811Hlera up•tOll'4at• facillti••·
lmaa Ahae4, like bi• father �•fore bill, dieliked tb• la1li•h

becau•• cd their eoatiau!na OCCUf•tiOll of ••• an4 the ProteetOTate.

Be

att ...ted t• 4iapel the lrtttall from hi• •Mlthena -.Ord•� ... �eun1te the
Greater y.._ ...Ser lat• centr.1.

Ill ..rcb

I, 19'81

he jolae4 the Vnited

Arab ..public, theD comprtaiq of Bant ... l�ta. 1a a f..Hatf.on called
the Unite4 Aru Stat....
power lu t...a.
anu d..1.

lsh a uaitJ vu loo••·

!ha X- v.a attll the

thereafter he ••ot lur to lbacov to n•aotiate for an

81• ualty with the Unite• Arab aepublic 1ileuced ladio Cairo.

and at the .... time, aade laaaer u ally ia hi• atruaal• with the lritiah

13

in Aden.

''Many of the Iaaa'• movea were with an eye to aboviug the

lritiah out of the chain of ahei�doma along the southern rim of Arabia
which bad accepted Britiah protection."

3

When fighting broke out between

Yeen and the British contt.Daent in Aden, Priece Badr declared "that
4
Yemen would accept aid from &n)'Vhere or anyone againat the Engl1sh."
The United Arab Republic in the eeantime had sent to Yemen teacher•,
technician•, and advisor• to help Yemen in it• internal and external
difficulti••·
Dr«lll Pearaon once called Imam Ahmed an "Old IWl&&rd."

Whether

auch a label vae juat'ifiable, it waa, never�helee•, a de•cription of the
man.

Ahmed vaa a cruel and vicioua leader.

Be beheaded bi• half-brother,

Seif al•lelaa Abdullah in 19SS, when the latter attempted to ouat him.
Along with Abdullah thirteen other• were executed in the aame manner.

In

1959, he returned to Yemen froa Italy, where he had been undergeing
and clamped down

medical treatment for hi• ailments.

responsible for the diaturbance of the peace.
and threw agitator• into priaoa.

011

all who had b.een

Be cancelled the refol'1119

Prince la.ctr went into eemi•retir•ent.

"Difference• between the two over Yemen'• future had ca•t
'
Prince al•ladr's chance• of eucce•aion to the throne."

•

cloud over

Ria chief sup•

porter• were reform-minded youth• of the kingdom and the United Arab Ile•
public.

While al•ladr had ahowo himaelf to be a progresat•e• his in•-

btlity to control the dieturbancea caused by hi• attempted refcnma.

---

3n1maa •!med l>l•• at 7li &uler of Yemen 9at1on," The
Evening §tar, (September 20, 1962). p. A-4.

'+stanlto
5

CJuleacu,

.21• cJt.,

ne EftDiDI Star,

�·

p.

321.

Cit., P• A•4.
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belittle4 hia ability to -..&e and implement refol'IB8.
i... Allaed'• reiga

vae very -..ch like hi• father'•i

"lo one coul4 enter or luve the kingcloa without

In all, however,

•trict i•olationiam.

hla approval.

Re

excluded foreip techeolo11. foreip lnv••taents, ad uove all fereip
Alme4 did •••1p foreip fl� to enter hi• country, l:>ut thi•

ideae."6

aome•odd•yeare, Y-.n ha41 fw car•• few factoriea., f.ew ltooka, an4 thl'••
or four aewa,..pera.1
Oil lept.-.er

19, 1962, X... Ahlaed died of natural illne.s•••·

eon, aactr, vu cho•n at the Great Moeque in Sana •• tbe aew lean.

Bia
Be

heade4 a proar•a•ive faction, and on •ucceediua hi• father, ha illmediately
aanoune" illportaat reforM, including the creation of .an elected
•••ellbly.
eD

Bi• proareaaive reform. never bad time for fulfillment, becauae

Septellber 26, 1962, a veek after hi• ncceaeion, a •iU.tary coup oueted

tbe toyal a�•rmwnt aad the Zaidi Dynaaty by bombardina hi• palace in Sana.
The Z•141 rule (the Zaldl 1ect of l•lam ta aleo a aect of the tel'Dl Shil,

..anlng party, referriaa apeeifically to the party of All, aoo·in-law
of th• prophet, Mohwtl) vaa di aantle4.

YWD uacler th• t.M-te rule

preeeotea a 411...l outlook ••Sai•tratively.

"llot a

atn.gle llinlatry

capule of perforaina a pPlic functloa vaa to be fO\JDd at the time of
the rewlution."8

'ow Ad•• Scbllidt, Jwa:
Reiahart and Wlneton. 1968), p. 37.

lJ!! Rpkno!p W•t,

7Tbe lven.iug Star, .22· ill· p. A•4.

8w1111• lrOWD, '"f--i 1>11-.," 1Ud4lt
•· XVII, (AutO'llll, 1963), p. 357.

(Mew Tork:

l!!1 J9!!£P!l ,
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The Yemen Revolution vae lead by Abdullah al-Sallal, who had
been the head of the palace guard and a former prieon•cell occupier
under X... Ahmad from 1948-1955.

He waa eent to prison by Ahmed for

alleged conepiracy with the 1948 revolutioniete.

lefore thie incident,

he had been eent to Iraq for further advao.ce4 military training.

Be

returned to Yemen vith new experience• and ideae that opened hie mind.
Re then began to formulate � political tdeolol}' baaed on Ara� Nationalism
and aoupt to correct the oppreeeione of the rule of the tmaaa .

Abdullah

al•Sallal va1 repeatedly aent to priaon for hie effort• by Imam Yahya.
In priaou hi• political thinking and ideas were atimulated by contact with
leading liberal• in the Y9men political jail at Bajjah.

Be became

acquainted with Koh8111Hd Ahmed loman. Abdulrabmau al•lryani, and
Ahmed al-Shai.

The fol'ller tvo were to become fU·ll member• aid

participant• of the revqlution.

The latter became ainieter of the Yemen

Legation in lmadon. r...iuing in that poaition after the rnolution.
Shami alao became the Boyali•t foreign miniater. and headed the loyallet
delegation to the Bara4b Conference of 1965.

All three had participated

in the 1948 revolution &Del bad been aaaociated with the free Teaetli
..,...n
. t

tn Adee.

Sallal won hi• rel•••• fwoa prtaoa la 1955 upon the

inatateaee of aac1r. vho bad taken a llktn1 to hill.
aaatpaed �y ...r to ba hadMtr ..ater at lloclet•ah.

Sallal vaa then
Ia 1961 laall Ab=ed;

•en•ina tbe danger of.Sallal, rel••�ed bia from hi• Job.

Badr then

appointed hi.mi chief of hi• peraonal guard without the taaa'•
objection.
Other pTOaillADt Y emeni revolution.ad.•• vere Moh••111d al•Zubairi.

16
DT. AWuru..n al•leldu.i, ud ICDh•iD al•Ainl.
p\Uliahmeat of 1-..a Ahmad in

1948

lubairi ••caped the

becauae of hi• participation in the

1948

•• flecl to Cairo ancl eatabli•he4 the firat initial headquarter•

d-1••·

for eail•• t.-..ai pol1t1clana.
reformed U.-te.
ad attempte4, to

no

avall .

09

..

to

find a haata for reconciliation between

Dr. laidani vaa fortunate to bne i.een ee11t

Upon th• uqent appeal of aadr • lJUa Alm9d later

to Egypt for atudi••.

loan•

iD C�iro agitatiD& for a

Under th• revolutiooary reaiM, ha aerYecl u a ainlater

republicaa• aad royaU.ata.

••t bbl to

•• remained

We•t GeruBJ to aene u 111D.1ater to th• Yemen

doctor of politic•l

ee--..

become th� �1Dgdaa ' • .COD09lc

.. retuned to Yemen in

pluaaer.10

he -.oved to Cairo a1*d lteaaa capalplq

1961

hoping to

When thi• faile4 to aaterlaliae,

qatui the :i-.

lie vaa penraltted

to engage Y04lf•tou•l1 la ..,,•• propag...aa ..tl•lti•• aaato•t the i..aa
becauae the 'Ola1te4 Ara 8tatu ba4 !Ma• teraiaatri tty Ru•er.

Th• termi-

..... va• l•raely cl•• to i- Almecl • • poea eond...lag
nation of the 'f�rau

8a•1er•e

toclalt..

-..ati�.la�

..
I

TU lora "1•� • � utloaaliae other ...,1.•e pl'O,.rty.

Let ua retura h hl•ic lawe'&Dd let u• have uaion on our tera.

11

Maaaer thereupon tertaUaat e4 the •ect•r•tieu of Arab ltatee that for three
year•

bad

•••ociated politically the feud.al Yemeni t=reeete with the

revolutioaary Uolte4 Arab lapul>lic.

Thi• event had

9

Adam Schai•t' 1..,:1!\! V!pkDOVl,l !!!!:· , .

10 angered Raaaer that

70.

Ull.9id. , p. "71.
lL'Koran

•· Soctalt•,"

Ji•, (.J._.ry 5,

1962), p.

22.
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apeculatioa• att..,u.q to

link

tion camaot �· ipored� "lt
mentiODecl

ta

Cairo, that

l••••r •• the engilaeer

�eblnd

the rnolu-

been videl7 repol'ted, although not

bad

Mr. h11er

engineered tile Saoa coup to aive pan-

Arabi818 and Arab natiooal1aa a new Aeian foothold after th• lo•• of
Syria

• • •

Cairo radio ha• 'been heard loud

8>'Vement in C•iro

had

all4

be8U. aided

ud

el••r
abetted.1112

ad

the free Yemen

llobain al•Aioi, in eoatr••t to the other leader• mentioned above,
\iaa the ouly pramto•t revolutionary froa the Z•id1 aec:t. Be studied in
In

in

Egypt and later

111

va1 �•11ed

1960 •��•ua• of bia aaaociatioua with radical Ade11e1e

ill

Sorboae.

1958 he bu... a teacher

Aden, but

elemen t• and becauae of his teach'na•·
A.U,

of the ah.c:Ne ...cloned

eapecially 1£ke4 lallal..,
realise hi•
•utPO••d

ova

..tao

..

aaae

a wewe re1pectecl by lach'. Re

a 11ke-aln4a4 liberal, would h•l• hi•

lillaral ...lratloaa.

''The

coef1dence be placed in hi•

frlead 1a

fact &4altte4 tbe llaaaerltea to the moat een1itive
imaer •tr#Ct•I'• of 1alaic f0¥9r aD4 prepared it• c:leatructioa.1113 ladr
bad a keu tru•t •l•o fol' .....r. Speaktq to reportes•
1962, he lamented aDd umttedi

aod

a brQtber ad bellnM

1a

011

ao.ember 11,

u1 ha4

alyqa coeaUei-ed b.ia.•• . friend
hi• pl"OldHe."14 •••rtb•l•••• tbe t...111

a.volutiOD beaen al>ruptly, all4 by al•ladr'• auP?O••d friead•, when not
aany outetdera we.-e ea,.otlaa it.

1'ot

91Gr• tha1l

tveo

ty•tour hour• after

12Jay Wala, "JUdeaat Taal.on &iaee," J!! Iork timee,
(October 14, 1962), p. 4·1.
lJo ana Sebm1Alt. J_.p: !!! V¥M!J! !!.£, p. 73.
·

14eptro 111••• ''Dead Kiq bu Plua to latuna. to Palace Soon,
Wa•hi!I� �. (Movember 11, 1962), p. A-20.
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it ha4 been carried out, Egyptian force• began arriving into Teman via
the newly finlahed Port of Rodetdah.

w..aer'• t... diate dispatch of an

expeditionary force into t...n to help the aepubltean• may �e attributed
to three factor• he avmredly belie9ed in:
inaugurated

oa

Pir•t, the Wattonal Charter,

May 19'2 by him and eatabllahing an icleologtcal baeia

for •0cialiea in Egypt, 4eclard on"the l1eceaaity of the Revolution:"
I.evolution b the only •aua, by which the Arab ••tioe can
free it•elf of it• •hackle•, and rid itaelf of the dark
heritage which bur4ened it. for, the element• of aupprea•
•ion 81ld aplottatton vbich long doalnated the Ar
Watton
'
and eeiaed it• se�lth will never willingly aubs1t.

-!

Second, the "element• of traclitioualt .. and reaction aga1net foreign
iuflueaicea are preaent �ut Arabi.. 1• more charaeteriatically the feeling
that the only way for the Arab• to be anything 11 for them to be them
••l••• • "16

Thin, he beli..ed that t-.a va1 ctue for a revolution, and

he va• ready to n�t f.�.

''We were aaked tot: help, aad we will r...in

there until it 1• certain the rnolutlon ia eecun."17
The Teaeni loyali•t• now begmi to 1ather arOUIMI the remaining
loyal family in the northern mountatnoua reaion of Yemen.
appearance of ladr
unify.

on

With the

the 1ceue. it &ecaae ea1ier for the Royalists to

They now had a coamon leader, and the Counterrevolutionary 90Ve•

..nt thus began.
The preeence of �SYPtian aoldier• ill Yemen prompted Saudi Arabia
to come to the aid of the royaliete.

1t waa evidently clear in it•

151Jnited Arab ..�lie, ll!.! Chart•I, (Cairo, IDfotaat iou
Depart..ut, n.d.), p. 11.
16C harl•• D. Cr ...
u•, I!! Araba g .£!!! Wotld, (Wew York:
l'rederick A. Praeaer, 1963), p. ,7.

p.

128.

17Jay Wal1, The IU4clle B••t, (Bw Yorltt

Atheneua, 1965) •
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infancy that the conflict had become larger in acope.
Behind the Imam etood king Saud and King Hueeein of Jordan
as Champions of legitimate government and wholehearted anti•
communiem
On the other aide were President Baaaer of
Egypt and hia followers, representing the gloriee of Arab
nationali811l and aocial progreee • • • • The claah between these
•

•

•

•

two group• haa overahadoved the local struggle in Yemen,
and ha1 threatened to transform the whole power pattern in
the Middle Eaat. 18

By January 1963, the situation had become one in which aocialiam and
traditionalism in the Arab World were pitted against each other--Yemen
serving a1 the arena.

It also became the stage for the atruggle for

power between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab llepublic.

The balance

of power was undergoing a strain, ae each internal faction waa now
eupported by an outeide power.
1

8navid

Holden, "At Croea-Purpoaea in the S&nda of Yemen,"

The Reporter, (February 14, . 1963), p. 37.
For a eimilar view eee alao:
Philip Morton, "Our Yemeni Policy: Purauit of a Mirage," The Reporter,
(October 24, 1963), p. 28.

C H A PTE R

I NI TI AL

A T TEMPTS

AT

Ill

RE SO LVI NG

THE CO NFLICT

Initial Attempt•

at

Reeolving the Conflict

"Preaident Maeir aeized

on the revolution in Yemen in September

1962 ae an opportunity to break out of hie isolation in the wake of
Syria'• aeceeeion from the UAll,

and regain the initiative in Arab affairs

for Egypt on the baaia of revolutionary leadership.111

Therefore, one day

after the Yemen Revolution vae proclaimed, an Egyptian expeditionary force
began arriving in Yemen.

Thia contingent had the explicit aeeigmnent of

helping and aaauring the revolution of eucceee.

Mo sooner had the revolu-

tion been proclaimed and the Egyptian troops etarter moving into Yemen,
than the reai1tance from the northern hiibland Zeidi tribe• began to form.
Although aucb reeiatance vae minimal at the outeet, it was 1000 to become
a major armed resistance.

Thie vaa possible because of several events

that tranapired after initial shock of the revolution.

First, Imam al-Badr,

who had been reported buried under the rubble• of his palace when the rebel
tank• shelled hie domain, appeared two weeks later at a Royalist camp.
appearance gave the Royaliata a coamo n, accepted leader.

Bia

Around him con-

gregated the Royal family and Royalist supporters, whoae main objective•
were the re1toration of the lmamate and legitimacy.

Second, Saudi Arabia

and Jordan began to aid the Royalist• by supplying them with
money.

&l'llll

and

Their main concern was the presence of United Arab Republic troops

and the creation of a hoatile regime in Yemen.
had worke4 againat both of thtm.

Since 1959, the Egyptian•

Saudi Arabia, in particular, becauae of its

lM&lcolm I.err, l!:!! Arab Cqld !!.!!.:
1958-1967, aecond edition,
(London:
Oxford Univereity Pre••• 1967), p:-141:--20
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traditional •y•t... of Wahuina dating from the eighteenth century,
wat fearful of it•

own

eecurity and felt obliged to enter the conflict.

�ing Saud wae reported to be therefore arming the Royali•t• because of
hie fear that if a republic were eetabliahecl on hi• eouthern border he
would be aext on the liat.2
It wae evidently clear at the beginning of the conflict that the
Jtoyaliet• were strong.

They coutrolled and maintained control over the

northern and eastern part of Yemen.

Such an area waa not to be relt.n•

quiehed, with the exception of the city of Marib, about 75 milee west of
Sana and Sada.

The•e northern and ea•tern region• had aerved aa the

Iaamate atronghold every atnce the geneaie of the Illaute rule in th•
ninth century A.D., abovt 100 •ilea north of Sana.
constant change of hande.

Sada unde rwent

According to Harold Ingraaa, the accusation•

lDAde by the Egyptian• that Saudi and Jordani� troop• were fiahting with
the Imaa'• forcea, or that they had been able to give any aignificant help
in the Yemen are unfounded.

The only help the aoyali•t• had receiYed

from Saudi Arabia and Jordan vaa food and perhapa money. 3

While thia

conteotion vae being verifi9d by all the reporter•, including Corlnel
McLean, M.P., who reviewed the Y.amen conflict from the Royali•t• and
Republican area•, !SYPtian troop• aradually increased in mmbere.
December, 1962 there were 13•000 UAR troop• in Yemen.
army wae ineffective aDd ...11.

By

Tb• Republican

It vaa eYidently clear to laaeer that the

Yemeni regimt 111U•t atep up it• pace in d.veloping an army capable of

2y. Ahkaryov, "Arabia and the Yemeni Revolution,"
(December S, 1962), p. 7.
(London:

�, Ruler•,
lttarold Ingr&JU, The Ieaen:
Camelot PTeae, Ltd., 1963), p. 135.

.!ru!

!!!

Time•,

Revolution,
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••fending the Republic.

P1el4•M.l.rehal Amltr of the United Arab Republic

v.. therefore eeat to Yemen in October to urge Sallal to11&ke the effort.
R• obliged.

&\it before anything could develop, th• first of many

aepublieau 4iaharmonies •rvpted.

It involved a personality confliet

between Sallal and Abdulrahman aeighani.

The intellectual, Egyptian-born

leidhani could not accept the Zeidi, self-promoted lield•Marehall, Sallal
a• his auperior.4

The disagreement was aolved by the unexpected arrival

of Beidhani in Cairo and bis •ub•equent talk• with Raaaer.

This meeting

led to leidhani'• temporary retirement.
The Yemeni problem cmae at a tiae when the United State• waa
involved crucially in the Cu�a Crisis of 1962.
from it• mind.

Yemen vae very far away

Nonetheless, the Cennedy administration, aa early 1961,

had been attempting to review its Kiddle Eastern policy.

It wanted to

negate the opinion held by "progressive" state• in the world that the
United State• aupports and abet• "reactionary" regimes.

In the case of

Yemen the United States could not openly give the Republican regime ita
recognition becauae of the complexity of the situation.

It waa Saudi

Arabia and Jordan, it• friend•, aupporting the Imam, and it could not
overlook thia factor without endangering it• vital interests in the area.
President Kennedy began peraonally to eend meesagee to Nasser and Paiaal,
urging the two to aubdue the aituation.

Ou October 25, 1962 Preaident

Kennedy aent a letter to Faisal aaeuring the Saudi Government of American
aupport.

Thia letter waa not forwarded to Faiaal until after the Saudi

town• of Majran aud Hisaa had been bombarded b y Egyptian plane• in
retaliation for Saudi eupport of the twyaliata.

4Ibid., p.

136.

According to the
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lgyptian•. Saudi Arabiaa iOVD• cloae to the Yeaeni•Saudi Arabian border
were ••l'Ving •• a refu1• for the loyali•t•.

Keanedy ' • letter was aot

..de public until January i963 after further l&YPtian air•raida had
In the lett•� dae Pre•ident saids

taken place.
full u.

s.

"You may be •••ured of

aupport for tke ulatenuce of Saudi Arabian integrity. " 5

While President lenauy vaa keeping in touch with both ••••er
and Paiaal. the State Departlaent begaD to contact all tho1e concerned
with the Yemeni probl... escept the Iaaa.
1ettl...nt .

6

It• aain objective waa a

Kennedy at the ead of •ovellb er propoaed atepe towar4 a

aett leaant to Crown Prillce Jalaal. King Buaaeiu. and Preeident Raaaer.
Once again, the Iaam , althou&b •till officially recognized by the United
State• , vaa left out . 7

The propoaal called on the United Arab R.epu1>lic

to withdraw it• troop• and aaked Saudi Arabia to withhold further material
aid to the Royalist•.

The United States, fearin1 Egyptian reject ion of
ly this

it• propoaa l , prOllli•ed to recognise the tepub lican regime .

method , it waa hoped laypt would give its acceptance to the agreement .
On December 19, 1962 the United State• 1ave the Yemeni Arab Repub lic full
recognition.
deciaiou.

It bad taken the United States three month• to reach that

The United Nation• followed with ita recognition.

Britain,

however, did not approve of the action• by the United State• and the
United Nationa and auggeated that the United State• bad acted in baste.
The rationale behind the United State• recopition of the

41.s.

Depart9"1nt of State Bulletine, (January 28 ,

6nana Adame Schmidt , Yemeni
7 lbid •

•

p.

186.

the
-

Unknown War, p.

1963) , p . 145.

186.
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Jlepublican gove rnment were •• follow•:

(1) the Soviet Union. lurking in

the wing• and waiting for an opportunity to develop

an

effective position

of influence in the laat year of the lJl8ll Ahmed ' • reian, apparently felt
that the revolution offered this chance.

Accordingly, the &u•aians lent

full aupport to the new Republic••arms, training, and economic aeaiatance.
The SoYiet Union alao

8WUDg

the

line on b.ehalf of the Republic.

satellite•

under it• influence quickly in

The People• Republic of China and the

comaaniat regime• in the Par Kast alao save qvick recognition to the
Republic.

They alao lent it moral and at time•

..terial

aupport;

(2) moat of the Arab gove ra.ente gave the Republic imaediate recognition
and pledged to help it; and (3) the United States could not afford to
1tep aaide and permit the Soviet• to have absolute influence .
State• apparently felt that

an

The United

American recognition of the Republic would

at leaat protect vhat�•r American intereat• were in the area and pennit
it to be on talking teru vitb all parties to the dbpute.

lurtber con

•iderat ion waa given to th• cl••h between the United Arab Republic and
Saudi Arabia.

In fact the �ennedy Admiuiatration hoped that Americao

recopition of the llepublic vould leaan the tenaion• betwen K&Ypt end
Saudi Arabia.
After the United State• granted the Yeaen Arab Republic it•
recognitioa. the �emen eituation thereby. wa• conaidere4 by the United
•ationa.

The latter beaaa an active attempt to alleviate the cri•i•,

after the S tate Depart11ent declared to n..,• correspondent• on January J .
1963 that "the United State•, •• an impartial friend o f all governments
involved, remain• convinoed that the beat intereata of the Yemeni people

2S
will be •erved by the diaeqagaent of foreign military force• aDd ter
ainat ioa of thia external intervention. "

8

The Secretary Oeaeral o f the United Rations, U Thant, di•patched
Dr. Bunche to Yemen on a fact-finding mission.
Bunche never viaited Royali•t held areaa.

But unfortunately, Dr.

Before hi• arrival in Yemen ,

the lgyptian army had ju1t vacated the Royali1t• from the city of Narib.
He vaa given a rouaing welcome in Sana and waa taken to the newly
"liberated" city of Mati� where he was greeted with an almost aiailar
reception.

OD bia return to America, he atateil that fightina in Yem.n

had virtually ceaaed and meationed the appallina eonditiona of the people
livin1 on the aoyali•t aide, which be had not vi•ited.

9

Be then vent to

Saudi Arabia aod to the United Arab Repub lic.
The reault of Dr. lhmehe ' • and Mr. Bunker ' • trip to Yemen, both
of whoa had gone to Yeaea

Oil

the beheat of Preaident �ennedy , reeulted in

the aeceptaace of the "cliaengaaeaent plall".

Uader thia arrangement , Saudi

Arabia aareed to atop aiding the aoyali•t• aad to deay thea the u.e of 1ta
territory •• hoaag e, while the United Arab RepQltlie agreed to withdraw it1
troop•.

It wae further agreed tbat a United Matton• Observation team

voulcl b e 1ent to Yemen to see that the clieeagag-.nt waa can-ied out.
The f laacial coat would be •hared equally by Saudi Arabia and the United
Arab lepu�llc.

The •i••ion would conaiat of 200 C•nadiana and Yugoelava ,

under the coam•Dd of a.Qeral Von Horn, who vould auperviae the carrying
out of the diaeqageaeat plm.

'lr·!·
A.

Departaant

�

It waa al•o agreed that the llli.1 eion would

State Bulletin, (January , 1963) , p . 9 1 .

9Geral4 cle Qauny, fal•al, (Jfw York.
Praeger, Publiaher, 1961) , p. 1 18 .

Waahingtoa:

Pre4erick
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remaia ill t.-en for
May 4 , 196J.

the duration

It vaa hoped

that

would be a camplate aucceaa

of

by

four mntha. The

Septellh er the

aad that the

•i••ion began on

d1aen1ageaant plan

Yemen problem would be reaolved.

However, thia waa not to be.
Eleven veeka after the dieengaaemeut plan took effect , General
von Horn reeigned from hie poat aecauee of fnittration and , from what he
stated, lack of cooperation from the United Nation• headquarter• and
inadequate provision of air and land traneport. 10

Von Horn ' • statement

was, more or leee, made evident by the S ecretary-General of the United
Nation s , when he reported to the Organization on September 4, 1963 on
the functioning of the Obaervation Misaion and the terms of the diaengagement .

Re stated that Colonel Pavlovic and General Rikhye ( U Thant ' •

military adviaora) had "advbed me that the present strength of the
Mission in personnel ia adequate to carry out its tasks if theee are
limited to obaervation and report only'� ll

such a tuk could not give

· the neceaaary and esaential help to the wounded in battle areaa, nor
could it keep the long border line between Saudi Arabia and Yemen cloaed.
The Misaion waa alao asked on aeveral occasions to come to the aid of the
wounded in loyalist camps, who had no medical facilitiea whatsoever, and
who pleaded with the Kisaion to inveatigate the alleged use of poison gaa
by the United Arab Repub lic on Yemeni •illagea.

Needles• to say, U Thant

was still feeling optimistic about the final result of the Mission. How•
ever, the Miaaion failed during the first four month• becauae:
lO ibid. , p. 121.
lllY!

SecuriEx

CoUDC11,

S /541 2 , (S eptember

4, 1963) . p. 3.
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UNYOH Obaervera have noted departure• of United Arab Repub lic ' s
troop• in aubatantial number•, but have aleo aeen replacements
arTiving, though in apparently lesaer numbera
Obaervat ion of
the M111ion to date indicate clearly that in aome important
re•pecte the term.e of the diaengagement agreement have not been
1
fulfilled by either of the parties. 2
• • •

On October 28 , 1963, U Thant declared to the United Nation• that
" I have no doub t . however, that a continuing United Mationa presence in
Yemen of aome kind, but not neeeeaarily having military attributes . would
be most helpful and might even be indispensab le to an early sett lement of
the Yemen problem, which clearly ia primarily political and will require
a political solution . "

13

On thia speech , U Thant aeked that the tent of

the d1aengagement be extended to January 4 , 1964.

However Saudi Arabia

was at firet not willing to abide by a new disengagement becauae it felt
the United Arab Repub lic had not fulfilled her part of the agreement .
With all due consideration, the United Arab Repub lic withdrew 4 , 000 men
out of the total force of 30,000 it had in Yemen.

Saudi Arabia on the

other hand stopped almost wholly the shipment of arae and money to the
Royalists.

It was reported that tha Miaa ion was more keen in it•

observation of the Yemeni-Saudi Arabian border than it was on the United
Arab !.epublic ' • wtthdraval of it• forcea.

During this time the United

Arab Republic waa receiving a substantial aid from the United States.
Ita involvement in Yemen prompted the Senate of the United States to
question the rationale behind the aid to Egypt.

Speaking before the

Senate, Senator Scott of Penn•ylvania said in effect:
12

Ibtd . , P•

3-4.

ll" Jleport by the Secretary General on the Obaenation Mission

in Yemen and Implementation of the Term• of the Disengagement , "
Y!! Security Counc i l . S/5447, (October 28 , 1963) , p. 8 .
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The United State• recopiaed the Revolutionary or quialing
Sallal regillle in December on Nasser ' • promiee to withdraw
hie troops.
He th• bM ll,000, and ha• now increaeed
them to 30,000.
Bia excuse was that Saudi Arabia was
aupplyina the Govet• Mat with &rme and ..,,,nition.
The Egyptians have been fighting a very dirty war

in Yemen, and there are many who believe that the aid of

$250 million over the year• to Egypt baa aaaiated it in
preparing arme and in financing thia war, a war in which
it bombs villages and strafes ahepharda and their flocks ,
and also drops ant i peraonnel booby trapa--a war in which
thoae who have been displaced in the Government of Yemen
wonder why the US
to be paying to have them con•
1
quered by Maaaer.

%....

Needle•• to say, auch heated attacks on Nasser were of no avail .
course of the war continued .

The

The escalat ion of Egyptian troop• con-

tinued, and Saudi Arabian material and financial aid increased.

Yemen

remained the aame as before••divided between Repub lican• and Royalists.
The UNYOM was renewed in May, July, and September of 1964.

The Secretary

General kept reporting to the Organization of lack of cooperation from
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Repub lic.

In March 1964 Preeident

Sallal visited the Soviet Union and signed a S oviet-Yemeni treaty of
friendship and economic and technical aaaistance.

In June of the eame

year, he viaited Peking , and a Chineee-Yemeni treaty of friendehip and of
economic and technical cooperation was eigned.

Saudi Arab ia, fearing

additional Egyptian bombing of it• territory, purchaaed warplane• from Great
Britain, and began erecting military basee near the border of Yeaen.

The

aituation waa developing into a dangerous conflict-·• conflict by which the
threat of war between the United Arab Repub lic and Saudi Arabia was very
poaeible.
14

However , near the end of 1964, an event occurred which could

"Proceeding and Debate• of the 88th Congreaa, Fir1t Seeaion , "
Congreeaional Record1 , #63, v . 109 , (Tuesday , April 30, 1963) , p . 6933.
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bne CUaged the couree of event• la .,.._.

A political aolutioa. the

Jeddah Aarem•t, va• nachri t.•twe• Pr••14Ht ..•••r aD4 Clq Pai.Ml.
It .ae followe4 by the Baradb COll!erenc• betve.. th• &oyali•t• aDCl the
le,.abllcau.

C B A P T
O M

T O

& a

J E l> D A H

IV

A R D

R A R A D B

The road

to D

�litieal

prompted by aneral nata.
pout.bl• b7

ea

eolvtioo of the Yemeni dileaaa v••

lacb 1.arou to a confereace

l1.7Ptiaa all ltary rw•T•••·

military l)ffeul•e. wbtc.h waa a

••

•d•

Tia• firat lgptlu •Joi;

failwu, r.ame in P'el>ruaey..Harcb of 1963

duriDa tbe f..ttaa 80D&h of I• odma.

lt• failure ,.rattted Pl•T Pa•quelli

Sp1ne111, pereODAl repreaentat ive of the Uuitecl ••tioaa Sec retary a..eral
U That

ta url7 1964 to 1aJ tile arOtllldvork for aqotlattou betvMa the

cOllbatat•.

Re veat to Calro, 'llya4b , mad Saa, propo•ill& IOPtia an4

Saudi accept.ace of hie r...-•t to alleviate th• •ltuatloo by neptiation.
Tll• lt63 Ullitd Aru

a.,-u.c •a 4efeat led _., people to 1>eU.ne

tbat Preald•t la•••r

ao loaa•r 41ee1n4 to �ta 1a .,.... aDd that bla

pr••eac• ua .,__ ...

.

.,.. tra.... .

political aM lllllt&rJ ltluader. l

.....r. bowwe r,

lat the trap offered bill th• opportuaity to reaala

....

of

kl• loat p..cla• be •£fared dori.aa th• t•ndaatloa of tile UllltJ batveea
l11Pt -" Syria.

ADI 1111t1.•

•1ctory ill

W l'1ac• 1a tb• Arcia peataaila,

.,_. would u1Un bill grNt

..S would J•opa�f.a• ar..tly tbe

pr••enc• of lrltaila f.a the South YmeD rederatlon.
the'l'•fore , .....r vu able at tla•
South Aruf.aa federatl•.

aw

••taa la

ts-. to atlr

Y-a,

41ecoateat 1la th•

Oc�loaallJ l17Ptl.aa pl••• woulcl etrafe tile

llOrtlMm MOtor of tbe louth Aral• fe4erat loa,

tNt aner

without

ll
reprlula froa tbe 1o7al Air force.

To fttl'tber iat... ifJ D4 &1Ye hi•

•tr•tear �r teeth, tu lgptiaa public vu 1.. to ltelift'• tbat thelr

aowea •t VU fiabtiaa ...ten, la ••rtlnlar, arttllh Upe¥"iall•.

Up

to tit.la time, the Ullit.. Ara ....- u.o hd awer li'ftll DY fora of
ack!IOl'l'lMpnat of tbe •leCac• of tbe &oyaliat1.
'I'll• ••094 -Jor l17Ptia of f.. t.ve waa undertake 1a Augwtt•

sept..•r 1964.
PriDc• rataal
M

Prior to till• o!f••i••• Preeldat h•MI'

hacl aar... to Met at Alaa.tru, !17Pt . c1ur1aa th• Arab

•t wtlDI of earlJ ••--·

a J!il

and crova

USWli &la

aordlea Y-.

The o ft- 1.. wu ai.Md at adlinlAa

It• parpo.. wa• lr.1111q, c.,tvrtaa, or

apelU.q the - ... ... a.,allat reet.taaee la tlM taortb.

.lltho9p

tbe a.a ... obU.pd to ft'an•t• hi• cna, the l111ttlaa troop• were

uancc..ahl ill

bnakiaa

&M loJ•li•t n•i•tac•.

•ttrlJMKetl to

Wok.

tile otf••i••

... ..... it• oetJecti••• •r...babla.

lt• fallen ••t be

.. ..... anpt nta •tora pract1cal11 cl"90ltillis•d

were tn,ped ta h•SW7

tanka

_. beayy pu

_. , ... alace dleJ cwl• aot be mrwed , they wr•

left •t �

ill ..,al1at territOl'J .

-.ac•M tu

1oN of w _.Mterlal •• too �Mt a

Tb1• •.-..Cle wae treumat1c to .....r ,
IMlrda oa

the alreaq

atrai.Md l�t.- ec_..,.
Outeida pr..-r••• ,.rttcularly frcm the Un1tM Stat•••

...ttaa INt'wm .....r

••

fa1ul W1CtN f... 11tle.

_.. the

'l'b• Ualt•4 St•t•• bad

tried fr• tu •ft'/ 1te1••taa to balt or at lwt e:o U11it t"• coafllct .
11Dce

...._ wu ..,•••,

• UI

vtumner po••ible • to VI detada.

aid, u w ot.11... to at•• cou•t ,
Saud1 Arabia vaa alao ••ry •ch

Wbaenc..S t.y tbe UI thr<M&lh the preaaaee of tile aipty Arabia American
Oil C4>Plfla7•

1$.

.

.. tb• .\Mrlcaa preaaur.. 11bicb reaulted ta Saudi
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progn••i•• refom.t

soeially. ec01l0llically ad politically.

hW

achool• &ad hoapit•l• were ereeted. and the Royal faaily '• budget vaa
cut draetieally.

Politlcal ,o•ltlona were

DOif

open to tho.• who vere

Althoqh the UI ..._.. for Sav41 retoru were DOt openly

quallfiM.

accep&.S, tlaey cl14 eeoourap tu laucll Awoiaa 1GY•1111•t to undertake
poaitiYe ...auraa.
!be

r•••lt of tb• failure• of the l17ptiaa of feaaiv•• led to the

eeetlaa 1a Aland�!& �•tvHn .....r aa4I rataal.

Altho\agh they both

the •et.lag vae a c�uaique iaau•• by both leader• which emphaaieed the
ueed to 1-rf.ag eout peace t.et1Nea tha two parti•• ta Ymea.

"T1'1• ua the

fir•t U.11& tut ti.\• •a:ntiau MMl officially aetDovle4aed the aiatence
of 'two partiea!"2
the partiaa.

The reault of the •etiq wae not appre�i•ted by all

The Repuf>licao 1..dera felt that the United Arab 1.epuJ.lic

gave the U.,r•••ion that R•••er waa "aelling them down the r1ver.n3

The

aaraeaent called for both et.tee to redue• their aid to the Yemeni faction•
and to try

to create a new coalition government excluding both Sallal and

the Iala.

Thi• fol'lllU la waa bitterly attacked by Sallal, who declared that

he conaiderecl effort• by outaide pow.r• to baraain over the future of
Yemen aDc1 hi• own poaitlon •• repugnant .

However, th1a foraila was t o b e

the sr�undwork for the Brkvit conference of lovellber 1964.
The Alexmder agre-.nt could not he accepted at face value becau•e
of the deep, hiatorical animo1itie• exiating between the "progr•••ive" and
2Qid. ' p. 207.

'oana Ad-. Scbaidt, "Yemeni Ponder UAa•Saucli Pact," ICev
Tille•, (leptellbeT 27, lt64) , P• 14.

J.2ll
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•tT... ltloeal" A� at•t••·

Tlli• aata&Glli.. ... h•iabteae4

�,.

th• t...a

conflict.
oa •• 11.de 1• th rnolat toaary &apt of Ill' . la•••r,
vbicb la breald.q vltla tile tradltl�l paat ia a att_,t
to "911.t a �etter t.t11te.
Preetd..t ...••r la a chari...tlc
leader wbo•• popular ..,..1 throushout the Arab vorld
mpttl7 ueta ht• mfttttoea f.D the IU44le lut and ta
Africa. Tb• Pan·A�� aatloaaliat Soc1aliat mcJYellelt
l
he ha•
••t la mtloa ••t .,.. fonard alway• froa con..••t to con
queat l••t it •lip l>ack aad collap••·
OD the otller ald• t• tra4ltloaal Saudi Arabia, hled
•till �J aou of th• peat A�e vbo united the k1Dg4<9 1a
Saudi Arabia la •
the ft.r•t two clec..•• of till• c•tury.
power ta th• Arab worl• bee••• of her contlaatal pl'opor
ttou • which t.aelud• tile holy plac.. of hl•, and h•r
wealth , ded.vecl from oil rweaue1 •hared v1th the Aruian
America 011 Ca11p811J . lllUdt Arabia 1• poverfUl aleo becauae
Crown Prince Jaiul , bnf.aa put aaide the 1Dca11petnt kiD&
Imel, hae tlbon htuelf willlas to f lpt for the surY1val of
the tra41tioul •J•t•1 vlth bl• f•11y u nalera, act to
refora ...
enaiae tMt ayat• aeoaomically, aocially , ad
pollticall1.

�

Th• lrkwlt Metiq ••- oe .,...... 21 1964.

•w loyali•t•

alMt alae bpubU.cau, with 8-41 mad lgyptiall <*•uv•r• , worked out the
t•lW8 of the e••••· fi�•·

'lhi• waa th• fir•t tta. a formal ..etina

betwe• aa,al1•t• •• ..,_lle•• had takea placa.

OD the third of

Th• lrk.vit aar••••t eatabl1ahe4 a ceaae- fire• vbich vu to

of ao,ali•t• and lepubllc... •boul4 aather oa 23, lloY..i.er.
••• bailecl la 1'.-.n.

Ia tbe citi•• of 'f.... ,.aple lit torch•• on the

root• of houaea celebratlaa the aareeatnt.
traditional ia T...a.

The ce••••fir•

!bi• fora of celeDration ta

Ia 1t41 aad 1955 tb• people of Y...a celelJrated

tlMa victorl•• of i... Ahead �•r hi• foe• bJ liabtia& torche• on the

�. A. Scbmidt, .,.... D1eput• i• Root.. l>ffP 1D
!!!'! !2m t1-�, (lept.-er 20, 1964) , p. 6! .

11.,alry ,"
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roof• of their llou••·
Tile Mtlonal coaferenee vaa to become an f!llbryo national
•••tlllb ly vbicb would

....

a pr,,.1a1oeal national executive of two

ao,all•t• mad two Republic-.. and one f.Ddepeadeat to a.._ta1ater the
country au plaa a Mtlou.l plebieeite, which would follow after the
l17Ptian v1tb4Tawal fro11
The &oyali•t• alao

!....a .

qra..

loth Sallal and th• X... would •t•p aaide.

to accept only one•thircl of the aeata

in a con-

Tllru•elptba were allocated to th• ul... ,

f erene• of 168 .teleaat••·

three•elptha to the abeUt• • wbo would ••rY• •• the aecular nal•r•, and
tvo- •iahtb• to other aotol...

Bowwer , th• Royaliata refuaed to accept

the lepubl1caa 4="11 that they agree
fora of pverwt .

1D

e4Yace to retain a repub lic•

They felt that tb.e plebiacit• would decide on the

outcome of the fora of anern rt.

They alao rebaae4 to accept the

d...ada made by the l.epultlicaaa tllat ..-ber• of t�e Bllldd lddia 1..117
be. excluded frma th•

••

acwenm•t .

It vu aareed tta.t th• conferace ahoulfl be held 111 Raradh , in
north-•••t•n

Y.... ,

but it vaa poatpolMCi indefiait•l::r.

the other for th• pottpoe--t of the conference .
Ad- ScbalAlt, the

r
..eou

lacb party blamed

lat accordina t o Dau

for tb• poatpOD••t were tut IUPt ancl th•

le.,..tt llcaaa loat iDtereat 1a ldnrit l>ec.u••
ailltarily 4111barruaed at tla.at tiM. 5

they were politically and

lt ••• tu belief of th• !gptln

aovel'll9elt
l that ...,. ul...• an4 notable• la tile ..pub1iC411l file vould aid•
vlth the loJ•li•t• if a coaf•rac• were bald at tlaat tt.. .

to

....

tbelr

fear, the Vn1te4 Aro lepul>ltc arreate4 •�•r•l ul...• olDcl abeik• aad
be... r�f f llaa t.._ lepubl1caa reat.e .
5sc:i.tdt,

J!Jl!!a II!! Jl!k!ft!

Militarily the)' were eabarr••••d

war, p .

210.
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beeauae ..., a..-.11caa eol41er1

had d•f•ct-4

tbe Iman•.. off...1•• of Ataguat•Sept...•r

to

!la• failure

Ulpl....t tb•

to th• aoyalt1t •id• after

1964.

ldtvit

aar•--t r••ulted ta tb•
l•1otiatioae

renmptioa of tbe var vltll a 1reatel' ferocity tluua before.
wre

reeuma , but aot -.&11 1'6S.

to

Tile l17Pti.an

kill,

ailitary cOlllllAnd

in

Y111881l

resumed

capture, or eapell the i... aa4I MMI loyali•t

Apia it

waa

uanccaa1ful.

The oaly

vaa to tl1alal1b their pOllMI' .

....rable
.

it• atrategy to

realatance

thial

in Y...n.

acc011P llebed

they

At the .-. tlme, the 1.oyalf.at•

were

lncnuiaa ta mmb•l' an4 wre gatalag ta Mterial banvan 9IM'I in
oraataattoe.

wen

Jon•t• md

l•ucll

troop•,

.. .. 11

..

!urop-

adept la tralataa the 1'oyali•t• ia the uae of 110dena

Moab ud bill lhl•••in, who bee� in tile

of the

ao,altat

force• , had �... active ta

anay of eft'eral tbouamd troopa ,

loJ•liet

aw

off... l••

of

..

rceaari••·

weapona.

Prtac•

year th• aiU.tary c_..cler

eatabli•htaa a

wlltch eened

•• tile

aeai•replar

apearllead

for th•

Ill tbia offeaa1ve tbe loyallata

Aprtl•llay 1965.

..re able for the fir1t tiM to utlU.ae th• ... of the ra4lo ad by
ors-tat.a tlletr pl_., they were eble to atrtke at

with

•r•

effectlTeDU• ..a wt.th

f.afllcat heftJ 4amll1• OD the

a anat

lo•• 1D --., ,

ao,allet i..Ma.

At

._ ,

ti!.• _.

ea.a 1UCcaa.

l111K iaa
ad -·

1964.

1'laaJ'

Olac• _ta, la:rpt auffered

_. tlae ct.ty of

Tall, ,_.,

The latter group bM

e�

po11tlou

W ....
,.. to

•rib rewl'IMl4 to

of JUl7 lKS, r.,r••tatl.YU

a.,ubllew, _, iM.,...•t• •t ta
Taif ._t feeto .

tnopa.

layptla

of

tile 1.oJ•ll•t•,

Arabia, .... •1.... tbe

lato bef.na

tlaeir -.rpace •lkff tile t.•1llml1ag of aa

aur

tba ad of

organised 1Dtal11a•t•ia
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oppo•ed to the bpublicau, loyaU.ata, ad B11ptlana.

Under lbrabha

Ali al•Waair• they 4•1&1ded the vith4rawil of igypt laD forcea , th.a

ing

halt·

of Saudi aupport to th• �•lieta, and tbe creation of a plebiscite

to detera.iu the political claetllly of Y--.

They were man diaconteated

with the way Y.-.n vaa balag aieueed au ver• tired of the aheddiua of
Y--i blood.
The T&if Mmaife1to ect&oecl tbia eeatimenta of the Yemeni people.
lt• pr...- 1• clearl, atatea tbat the ...t>era were .eet iag &Dd aiguing the
Haaif••to "for tet1eD '• 1aka1 for her people ' • happ1aeae1 according to

that brought

l•laa'• aplrit to noU the continuation of the tragedy
diaaatera to t-.u , aod for our belie.f ill the ri&ht
people of ••lf•deten1ioatioa alMl the ayat... of
chooau foT itaelf witbout esternal illfluence.u

of

the Yemeni
th4t it

1overD1Dent

6

lta eeaential contri-

button vae the fonulatioa of a Y-.i atate 1;&lled th� "lal•ic State of

Y...a. "

It would be 1.. by a COUAC i l of State,conaiatina of eight mimb•r• ,

vbo voulct r..reaent all th• aro.apa in Y...a.

The COUDC il could have

pawera equivalent to tbat of a pre1ldent of a •tate.
Kiaiatere, who•• p<N•r• would be aiailar to that of

A Counc il
an

�f

aecutive bo&7 of

a atate and conaiat of •iahteea to tvt1Dt7•four ainiat•r•, would aerve ••
tbe aat illportat aroup.

The third body of tile aov•rr

cot

would be a

Coaeultatlve Coma ll, cOD•i•tiq of eight .-bar•, aa4 baviaa the uaiped
cluti•• of dlTeetf.aa aDd helptna the Counc il of Hinlatera.

Thia Nanife1to

vaa •iped bJ S41 ....•r• cooeietina of lapubU.cau, a.oyaliaca, aud.
1ntel'IM4lat• aroup.

an
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It .., �.

••14 tbat t•• Talf Hllalfeeto

of the Vaited Arab ..,_lie

p.at

-

....... to

10

the ecOll09ic pllaht

�etvHa

it a lND

Octc*el' 1962

lt.uu..

...

Jae 19'4.

laptlaa flnaacial

it eou14ered 1t too mcb ot • rlak.

Stat .. r.ihaced it• wlaeat eW to lant.

TUM

tbe wtlDa ca.aw beaf.a,

ret•tioe
_., M

ot

factfta were 1D tba alDcl•

tut .....r

vu

J.a

However,

CMM ..

••tlal diM&r••••t• betwea

held

ti&.• WN• ''k••U& of twa ." _. raiaal

eUai•t..

UDited

The

of botll &ant ... s-.. 1 Arabi.a .taea .....r l••• 1a Jeddah.
before

.ut

•
ll ad
to J..d

Accodf.aa to atlaoritatiff ut!Mtea, &ant lo•t altouc

widl ra11al.
lS,000

..t..
p
r
a

aad

ta.or et "tta. lt•t• of taa. "7

ot the ltelid tbat th•

1..1

tut t.he term

It ... alao l"e,orted

...-11can n&1- ••

alreaq a accompU.*-cl t.t, .U it• ,.,.1tl• cCMaU mt '-• coatiaaeat oe
.. alectioa

or

pleltl1tel�•·'

Bow..ar,

tla...

vere but •pecu.l•tiooe prior

to tu ...ttaa.
Aft.er two aya of ...c.s.aa, fruW•t ..••tt ad KiDI hlaal
aiped tbe ,,...... ap••••t .
to �• .Uiaterpret_.

a4

lt ••• poaltiw _.

.uc-.tl'WMI.

ft•

-

taat.l.

lut

•ar•--t called f.-&-

it •••

aa 1-·

di.ate c..... ftn. the ... of S_.i 8Ufp•n of Cb• loyalist•. md tile tw
cU.at• atart o! vltWr-1 of &be llJftla torce•.

A tbll'tMID 90llth ,.rio4

•• allott.. for tlae vltMrwl of tbe troopa atoll
60.ooo .

..,

rrt>ued ao.&t

The •ar•....t •• to b• carriu out ill thr.. •taa••r

f1r•t, a

7D.A.. ldmf.clt, "1�1ti.11l for..•• Puce ill y_.. , .. J.t! I2a
tl!!• · (Au11Utt a1. 196S) , , . 2.

'"rataal

a ... a.tu

Aft•r T- talks Wlt1l ..•••r,"

I2!l Tille!, (Aul'&•t 241 1965) , p • .8.

.I!!

J8

boldla& of • ut ioul T•mi pleltleclte wu to lte ul• to 4etenatae tile
tne of pee ••t ,_ w to lln•I ...a c.lllrd , l&ntlaa tnope

&IMa

to vtdulr•.

hltber

eke wtlaa.

A coallt laa pnn mt VCNld be •elected

..,..ll•U or tlae a.pultl1c-. •r• praaeat at
fUt1-

bJ a

coafel'1M• oi tri.Nl leaden oi ltoth ioyall•t• aDd bpub ltcw .
cOllfereace

1lbo

...u

••t la ..raA oa 13 llcwellber.

on.red a et., co tM tf.atlti...

epllt, ..,_,call)' Md poU.tlall;r.
4"•t10D

bee•"

were

Tbe

leth kllal and th

ft• ..,..11cw

.,....

ac

tbat tlM

a... ot diem -r• la Bant under

of tM1r o.- 4•fiaace of

forMl' Pr.tar .Aimed ....... ..a Abdul ,..._

Sallal.

Aama

al•liyaal.

affor4M tb• tb• opport•it7 to ntura to 1'-.

tb• were tu

The •ar•••Dt

� hailed ttMa aaree

-t. but all qrced tut lta aucc..a d.,•ded oa Saudi ad lsntlaa
t.pl-tatioa ot it.

*87, however, coaaldere4' the •ar•••t

...ked "Mlliutoa ()f fat.lure for tb• l&JPtUaa. ut

aa •

Other• coat.eaded

tbat "trealclelat ...••r baa cOlllt
ll ted hia preatla• oa t� eurv1••1 of

a

republic la T-.. , a..t U.. f&lMl ins isted tbat tba COUllt1'7 , chariDg tbe

tl'A8ltloaa l ata.. , l>e callee.I ablplJ etate of Jw. '' 10

The qre•1at

41l1d aot _.tioa ..Utber la llal •• tbe 1.- were to vltWraw wile 1t•

,._.,ck 1111..a. . 8A letWck tor ........ ."
(Auguet 27, 1965) , •• s.

im

II! J!D l&lu•

1°tl...Sr1ck &alth, '111uMr m4l Fai.. l Sip T-- Pact, ..
t'••· (Atap•t 2s, 1t•s> . , . 10.

JI!

•

..a th• lil:pu!Jllcw t..ui*'.. &Mt cbe vol'cl "ftllDU.c" ltbouW k •lat•iMd.

-..... . tbe

1o1allat• _. ta.. a...su 4•••M cut t.b• tem "•t•t• oi

.,_" " .... atll ta.. •l•iacit• vu ,.....

It cottl4 t.e ..W Sa !alnua duat 1•1.ul vu beiDg Mile• .. a
1rut l....r ..tlo1
bu ._ - .Utue a& llr. ......... ..... bJ -.CHN6Jlq
cton the l&nt t.a Arrq ad PTOt•ctlq bi• °"" tbroae
tb"'*lb hla fiuMial M&•ial• ad pell.ti.cal _,,.,rt to tbe
b..rdecl trlkl follWft• of Iw Mat '' al•ladr. R• hu
atr-.stlMn.. tlae ..utica1 ..._. of Are wnb• -4
...rat•• wbo favor nolut1cm ... onoa• rnolutloa. 11
v
..rtna

Other•, howfter. held that WU•n• oace apta, bad put a 1ut oae oY•I'
rawl.

WMtlunr tu Ja44ala aan-t would nccee• ol' DOt, ralaal u
earl)' aa O«olter 31 ••• Miliaa lt .. a ncceee. 12

btmelf to be

aa

ra1N1 b-4 prow•

utute f'-t•r aad • adept polltlciu.

H• bad aot oo.ly

illprO¥ed tU lite f.D l...f. Al'aia itMlt, IMat Ud &lY•t ....t W8 a

cl'WlbU
.
... arclaale ne'-•

a

compared to tlaat ot ........

- eplrtt.

Kie pr.. tip aroad vu l>ef.aa

... QC!
ftl• al-.. u.u... •1'• wiu

preetl.p i01' Ilia.
OD 23 .,.,_.er cu lofallat• _. tlM kpublioa r.,r..
eacati9ff •
..t la lfaraA.
end •••• .....

'rbe ....
.,llcm ..... 1... "1 AIMtul ans= •1· lr,ot
n. IOJaluta wen at..... bJ Alllled al•Sh-1.

coafereac:e ba4 u lt•

.......

The

cha foll.qwi• it- wilt.ch •r• _._ttted ••

1 1"..tTeat to .....r."

IB l!?m ttM••

(Auguat 29. 1965) • p. 2£.

12aadrf.ck ltd.tl\ . ........,. Speeding T-..a Pullout. 0 !.!! 12.t!
Times , (October 3 1 , 1965) , p . 4.

•

--·

of prcmot lq •olvtioa9:

(1) , to d•t•raiDe the fol'll of aov•rwnt

chariaa tu period of lapti• troop wlthdr•al; (2) , the creattoa of •
provl•t.al c81Det to rule the couatry cluria& the temporary pl'OY1aion&l
g0¥a1a ..t • ...S (3) , to det•llline the type of plebiactte to be held.
ad41tt• te tllue pr1-l'J factor•, the conference

bad

Ill

to decide on bow

to cleal with wrled subject Mtter. Reh .. . how to uat.fy tile acs.dala•

tratiaee of the lepublicla ... loJ•ll•t r•a!Jlea.
aaDJ

..11

l ecaa•• there were ao

IMat atpificaat •ttn• for th- to declq, the couference

bee-. coafued aDd bunt•...

ror a vbol• month , the coafer•c• oaly •t

three tS... , ad .turt.q thla tS. tllq aquabble4 ad accuHd each other
of ba4 faltb.

lt

......

tllat the Jeddah qn--t wu illterpretecl OD an

illd iYidual k•S.. , •• then

411Ml1D&.

waa

u aaay 1Dterpretat1ou of it u there

Tile 4i•banac>DY of the coofereace and it• coaheiOD were

eaplicltl7 atate4 la a letter to PT..ideat .....r a.ad � rateal by the
lapP11ca aroap:
Uafortun&tely the &p-•....t at Jecldah •de DO ..tiOD of
the Baai4 ld4ia f-117, wbicb baa alwaya dividN our pa ople,
which bu be• the caue of our trou&tlea ill the put aDd the
pre•ent , the c.. ,. of all oar •••tnaettoa aad bloo4•1etttaa .
U the S&lldi ad K1fft1a 1a.e1wta hfte aareed on what
the eupe"l•i• c�ttM u.
oaac.. (that th• Banttau
wtll wlthclraw) , we , the repr..otativ•• of the repub lican•,
••Mrt tit.at JOU tt..r flall reapoui'-lltty, md that th• fate
of the Y- 1• la 10'lr h.anda.
ror it 1• only you who ua
•tleace all the weapoaa that bne be• put iato th• hand• of
tile two part1•• tbl'Ollpaut the whole period of the paat thrM
7..ra. Toa aloe• are ta • poeltloa to 10l•• the probl•
without ilPlolviaa your owa people ta war or without aubjectllaa
tla• to •n dutructlon aad blood• letttaa.
'l'M HU of ,..._ were oblipd to fight OIM another ,
411,_t.. hft• b... ealtiate4 woaa th-.. ad &tw8 of •11
kiDda ••r• offer.. by bod. aow•rmr•ta. You lane off.red anat
8\m9 of mMJ wbleh benefited the ..rcbata of war.
If JCN bad
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the power to aake the Yemeni people fight one aoother
we •o �•11..• that you
peace aad atability. 13

have the power to ••tabli•h

The fai lure �f the Raredh Conference aarked • returu to var
and the rel\mptioa of kil ling.

lt• failure can not be aolely bl..-4

�leg Faieal, while the Karadh CODference v•• beilla held,

on Maaaer.

agr•ed vit� the Shah �f Irma to call a M�•l .. au.Dit ..etLA&.
overture• t. o the Shah ap3ered Maaaei·.

F•iaa l • •

the Sheb bad for aeveral year•

been an aaath... to Maaaer becauae be bad allowed Peraian oil to flow
1Dto larael.
tion

· ae had alao bef:ill vociforoualy attackt.Da Maaaer ' • iatervan•

1D Yt191D•

aact had occaail;)IUllly • lipped anna and IDC>ll•Y to the

Th• Shah had an equa l di•lik.e for laaaer t>ecauae

lloyali•ta.

be feared

bl.a wroacbsnuta aad p-owlq 1afluace la the Araiaa peaiawla ad
the Parala Gtalf.

A• for Paiaal,

he bad 110re to p1a bJ a Httl.-nt

of the Y...a coaflict , at.ace a aettltlllt
leD
would have •••ured bi.a of a
••H of Mal'it7 la hi• 808tun boner.

R-..e r. lie probal7 realised

that a further t..t of atrenath would •• neceaaary and that th• var ill
t...a vaa liable to drag
Por ala>at
la B&Ypt.

og. 14

a entire rur after Jecldala. Sall.al vu kept iD es1l•

OD Aupaat 1966, be -.ldnly retvned to Sana •cl

eooa aftenarct

Allri , loMa. an4 lTJ•l veat to l17Pt to plea tbelr c•••·

h1-elf.

••ill they •ought to ••• ..••er.

Inateacl, tbey were not pera1tted to

leave l11Pt•

l

lruea

froa sei.aut .

14.D,Y. , P•

244.

x.p: the Upk!o!!t uar,

pp.

242- 243 .

Ia
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to Saa coul4 DOt bne �.... accQllf li.tlecl

&•llal ' • retuna

vitboyt lgyptlaa acqulaaeence.
to

It vaa a •�l of !111>t ' • datermlaatlOD

uU the mat of their po:1ltioe ill .,_ aow that c019Proai••

rul.. out.

111pt tan datendaatlon to

va.

n.aiD 1a Y...a alH affectecl

f'•i••l ' • effort• towar.la aa I•l..tc •11.,...nt .

PToll it• earlieat

canceptiao, tile Uait.. Arab Repub lic had veb....tl7 attacked it.

Row

tMt Callfi"Oalee ••• aot forthcoa1ag, the Vil lact:'a&aecl it• verbal
•i•aivinp ai.out

die�ppearllDC• of the pro.,eet• for
trip• to

a1De

Thia rnulted ill the

a Itlatc alt11 mt.
an

lat...ic coafereace.

Paieal ' •

Ialaic •tat•• could llot gather eaoup support to fora

a •1pa1fie.at aati•l17Ptima alliance , aiDc•

DODe

of th• coa•eJ"Yative

reaille• F•i••l Y1tite4 vaated a �o1lfr<JDtat1on vlth R••••r. l'

loyal i•t• •

OD

their part, were fearful that a IalAaic a1U.aee al.gilt

da11pa raiaal ' • vital

5*

The

•pport
1.H

1
1colll &err ,
C>xlord Vlliverait7 Preaa,

for t!'.-.

Ara

-ri6�p.

£!.14 Var.
150.

SecOIMI 141t1oa,

(toado1u

C B A P T I R

V

Due to tbe allita17 ••tbaeka tbe Ualted Arab lapublic faced 1D
.,__

1a 1965. th• l&ntiaa llilitary

C(J

'IDd adoptecl • DMI

which tb., called the 01oq �reatb pol1cy."

1

Thi• policy n• alMd at

wl.tWnwtaa tbe &anti• troop• from th• bighlod•
.... eaat of

'lemea aad

C01aeeatret1D1

saaa , lludeUu. &114 Tau.

of

alU.t•l'l' plu

la tbe GOrth. we•t,

tluml OD th• three city•trlaaal• :

Sucb a coeceatration, they hoped would Mlut

botb the l11Ptiaa ... tbe &epubllc... troope.

Alona with thi• pollcJ

the l17Ptl.u attempted to all..iate the cliecoatat v1th1D the
lapubllcan r_.. bJ calliag Sallal to calro AIMI r.plac1D1 him. temporarily
wltb firat lloll1aa &IMI tbea Oeaeral Aart.
th• 1.epUbllca

Fore•...
order

411•ba1W08J

Tbla atep ... adopted becau••

bad created wbat beu.a koowa

•• th• "Third

lt 1• appropriate to trace the comtDa of the tbln force in

to Mk• the UDderetaadiDa of tbe laptiaD policy 11e>re plau•ible.
!be loJ•l1at victori.. aad the �reak4own of the lrkvit ..etlDI

,... nid..ce of a •jor rift 1a Republic• ranka .

Although there ha4

D•ea diea&r•..•
•
t• ...,.. tbe a.p.abllcaa• la the paat

OD

fanctloae of tbe Uait•• Ar� lapuit11c 1a t...a . thl•

waa

t�e role aad
the fir•t

ti.lie

that auc:b 4iffer.acea bee... vldely e.1deat . 2

low •·

lolll4
ll t.

twas IJ!! pPDon

12!.\ J&e•, (l>ec.-er .z7, 1164) ,
(l>ec.-er a. 1964) , p. t.

'Is!
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Wtr, p. Z74.

P•

7.

!••hWtoa P09f•

0. Dec...r 11, 1914, a ·ea, z.Nll'l, -" Al•lr,al nat
p..
epill•t Sall.al ' • ••t•rltJ.

le ta•• • aut1ar•t ...

•tat• of wr1eac7.

lallal, wtlo

iu&wct.t that tb•

fot"Mr alaiatera of tlae eaf.Ml k trW tor "crl.•N apf.aat tlae atete. ,. 3
fti• 4ff lnatt.oa 1t7 lallial lt•wlltt lato ••taa tile dalri force, 111lldl W
it• 1te1t••aa• u

..l'lJ

• lMJ.

u•l• end9t1Al• ta..ta • cMlr oppoa ttioa to tlae ft&iM• ef prniou•
i.... were C011Cened.

n., .- h'o9 th• rmk• of tbe ..,..lie

•• from thoea .-0 bad Mt

atwa

aa .. 11

chair alleaiw• to tbe ...., an•nmmt .

I..,aal aM llaN• are � -. laipl7 napectecl _, illpon.Dt ...-11caa
Wllao dU aot cbertall

tlMa

...uttJ of laU.al ...

vlao v..t.. to l••• th•

•tlaoritJ of dae IJait.. MA ..,.. u.c I.a U.. UiplmatatlOla ot ,olici••
.... •1 tM
8o

...-iu.

ftMI we pomtaeat wrn••r ot the tlltn fone .

•lAI aoc ceme froa tM

.....

of tbe ...-11cw, 1• Dr.tda al-Watr,

aepbw o! AW.llala A1-VM1r, -. ... the l....r of tla• 1941 rnol•t loa.

poeeQle , to .-race it.

lowwer, da.•1 ven

41aappo1at..S.

TMJ i.-.

ta.a ltp..lt� •1m•aiatrat1oa iaeffieleat ... tbe Valt.. ...-� liepabllc'•

ao,alt•t• _. tbel'� _. tile var.

3-.fnd

w.

Wwr,

l!tftrp Jwai l!l!·l!!t·

Jobe 8opk1u Prua, 1967) , P• 215.

(aaltt.ore 1

.,

tbe pn•tia• of the toJ•li•t•.

fol'C•·

ftq

•r•

llou of the ioY•U.at• Jo,._. tile tbln

•Je,tq aucceHlve polltlcal ...S a1U.t•l'7 1•iu at

tll• _,.... of t1l• ...-110 •• tile Ua1te41 Arab ..,... lie.
P
..rtq tut the pn.tlp of the ..,Ulf.c vu oow at

aa all·

tt• low ..,.. t1l• T-l•• tll..•l•••• _. fullJ -r• of tile lacl"•••ila&
oppoe ltloe to tile coat.._ect pre•mc• of lara• tllillb•r• of l17Pti• troop• .

Sallal dac ldM to att_,t to aol•• tile pTObl-.

OD 11. April. 1965. lae

.... 11o1a... ......

..tloaal Pde• Coafereace of ...,_. lie• 1...en to be beU at 11e1r. ia
110rtbera y_., to dad.de to fom • apeclal c�tt•• to ..U peace

cwertur•• to tM ao,alf.at lea4ara.

..t tlilf.a Cft'art.un 4141 not U.e tlae

_,port of eltber lallal or ••••r.

X-.i•t•lJ after the coefernce,

•r• laJPtiaa troop• 'llCWM loto t.....
lallal appolatM atS...l f •• fnaier.

4

.... ••• loRecl to nelp, and
Tbu n•t waa aooa follOlfM b)'

.oluatary •ile of thlrt,-anea 18pubU.c.. !Mo the Alllr•t• of aa,taae.

Th• f iaaco of tb• 1.e..tr Coeferaace we• tb• raapoa•t•111ty of
t1ae Ualt.. Aro lapabllc.
cnat..

c... tou

Por poU.ttcal _. alllt•rJ" r..aou tlaey

.... aai•tJ la the c•fereace

� t.acr..•iaa th• appre

bwiou of the le,Uliea clel•a•t•• coaoeraf.aa tla• !nrvace nle.S
Tiley •t• aot 1Mlllt the lepublie to recoacile it• probl... vtth the
RoyaU.ata.

Bowwe r, ••• re•lpatioa and lo)'aU.et Maea••••• ta tbe war

41!! 1213. Iimea,
S.lbdu

(D..acuai

(.ha'IM 29, 1965) p p. 8 .

al• Illah Ab4u Allah, geltpte ti tbe X9!! anolust.99 .
D-.•cu• Palace, a. d. ) , p. 201 ta Arable.

ft• lgptia• wre

Melt ..tot t.tt-..

fore.. Bant to

tlaelr p091t1• ta T- . •lela lat•l1

bAMl

.,. vonl..

-.._. quite _.tMle

Uout

•

....... vu .- beiaa ,_... to ailllltt Cbat T- ... la .... of • po11t•
lo•l aol•ti.oa.

It.a prwiou et....t

_.

tile ..,.lie.

couoUAace

•=••••

lt la ta.or

fte

dlin

..,•11.w

apob1

r•

tlMlr

11U.itar,

tllln

tt.elr

Jedda

Ibrabm al-Wair �-- the

Accol'dt-. to Ilia, 'fWD could •11

ttae ...- u.cw _.

hr

tlae

a ••outeu.rr• _._, altu cbe

4lfferw...

fofte.

•on •1•

•ietol'1

Wllea he .. ttala poU.01 fat.u.111 . be

force •ee••

puce it Mtla ac..-uca,
co al•• up

to ac:laine a

ot a ,olhical aoi.. 1-, l...iq to

nwllecl

of tlae

lwMI Mea

atta1D

.,,alle:ta, wue wt.111Da

ulU.aa .,_ a "a.public" or a "Si...
oe. "

Y-, ...,_er, CNPt to ... to.-111 called � lai.tc Stat• of 'fwa, n
aw _.

alao

....,.....

Twa.
to

.,..nwMI � ta.e Aarta

01'

1•1-ic Law.

lt• •t.,l�• a.er the pTe•-.c• of l17ptf.aD

1au.11 Aral.a ttaa•IM tlN thin

belrt... .

Rwer,

The tlltn tore• hu

fo�

aad tlllCCNft... tbe lof•liace to

tlM tlalrd ton• 4W

lore••

1a

oould INt a ueiul ..,._.t

come

to ten. vlcb t1l•.

eot s-..,•• pott ltlvelJ' to ,_., 0"9rtwee,

tur•bf loelat tile fiDIMial aw it

had

a.._

to r••l••

f�• ra1u1.

'l'bia 41A aot , bawner, Wtaa • _. to tu -.m1at , wlalch 1• •till
aoU:n a..at

weak.

'ftte �ecall ot lallal la lMS to &IJPt

-.... ,... cl ieaatlefi
...

with

hta.

vu u fOll'lln or c-..t.-t. 7

'*-tn4
Jo-

w.

WenMtr,

A. lc..Ut ,

lallal

wa

eouldeNll • •tsa tlaat

-. Dot

a colort.1 peftOD, aor

Bia wecall •• al.o tboaabc to It• part of

!p!!p Jeat !!J:!·l!§!,

T9!1t D.! U!k!o!p !!!I r

p. 219.

p. 27S.
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• -..1tt• •ar••••t b7 rataal ad ....... t.o ._.. a coa#•l•t ..,.t
to

wttWr•

betb lallal .U •l•...I' &a. tb•

ltec-. • .,.ol of atal.ate.

a_.

Th• aap8U. ... •

of "•ta.•

...

htla bad

tu ..c 11041erat••,

re61H4 to •• eOMU.r tile n.ot••t ,oNiltl11�f.u o! taci.staa tile

1•14 Mella faailJ 1a ..., - arr-._..

OD &U otber -.. , t...

ao,all•t• reject.. _, 8fte tORM• pemf.ttS.C lallal to

1a a COllfromi•• an•r•••t .

plaJ Q7 role

tbt. 4udlock prnalled at tile 8ara6

CGaf•we.ce. Tlaenfore , Wlail• Sall.el ntnat.. to C.iro, al•a..r .,..t to
Tall, .._., Araltta.
1a

Aqut lt6t tu ao,all•t• •t ta Tait wtta. IUq t•1••1 _.

ucuu.-.. • •rale owll, ..laa u. •r1 t• • Uld.t.. wrc1a7.
Pwer ablft.. iato tu had• of Pl"lac•
e�wnder-ta•cld.ef of

tbe

ti>lar td bl.II lhl•••f.a who

...ten MglOll.

vae

•• vu • -.r-

Prt.c. Mr*

..u.c 7omg -· 1llao Ud acllin.. the n.,.ct of the .,,.11.at trlb••·
rroa tbl• •••t ... .,.._ . "f7 ...
ort•t fJ.pre.
tlM ••fenace .a.c:Ue4 co op.a a 1-r•l of feul••·
4ecl•1- we

Tld.•

Mc>pt.. a..-.. tbe .,,alht• W loat tile .tlltary ••••wm

*icla lla4 i.... tu s�..._ to adopt tlM "10lll atnatll toliey."

Tbe

lack of ldllta17 c.afU.et ... _...._ dl• 1o7allat trl.Me nat l•••• aad

tbeJ ,..... aati.Ga.
faiaal fo� MWUal

.,...... tla• cl.ct•'- of the c.tenece -�

re•HU•

tint of aJ.l, fal.Ml ... raaU
.
... Uet IMa

4U eot .... tbe ..,all•t• u ..a aa th.,. ..... Illa.
ialerull.7 nloma• _, of it• tutlwt'-8 ud W

.-.titw

of l�• ,_,1..

w--a-t to nfom.

8..1!14• • p. 27 S.

llo

a..li Anbia W

ilIIJroY•

die U.•111&

1-.u 4W 1t "-• co wlt fow Datt.. lt•t••

la Id• f.atUWioMl tl'ipa altnM• hiaal W

.
relat1oas witll tla• Shah ol Ir•, liq au- of llo'fOCco. K£aa
c....t••

Hu••la of Jorda ... Pr••ldeac JobaltOD ot the Ullite4 Stat... MlU.tarily
Jae vu al>out to be atr-atJi...S .

ID Decemer, lt6J, S-41 AnbiA

-ao�lete4 . 4eal with lritain for tu purclaue .u wtallatioa of
t1lirt1•..,.n -'>11• 'ftauDdenin aroulld•to-atr 111••11•• a4 to put iato
opnatloa t• J•t U.ptera •t a bu• ...r tlae boner of 'I-.

Tbla ia lt••lf

at.Ml• of 1966, t1ae lutallatt.c. vaa ..ul7 fio1•e4 .
an• teudl Arata tr••••oua lnerqe.

It ao loqer

17 tile

W to ..,_. oa

tlae America ur fore• co ••w�nt• to l&nt tbat Seudl Arabia
aoftl'•ipty

would tte •I.at&.....

lnd1 Ana.ta aow eould d«f...S it• on

tenitol'J with tlla tnu1oraq IM1f of •re__, pilot•. Dd tb•l'f on
pilot• were t.elq tl'al.DM.

n. Mc_. nua raiaal •1• 110t wiab tu BoJ•llet• to UDdert.U
• 1eural oft-lY• vu 1Mo-• the &l)'pti• fore.. ba4 reliaqulall.S ....,.

ar... ta

tbe ...ten _. aol"tMra part of T-.

a.natb ,ollq."

Tbla ,... tile .. loaa

Accon1ql7 , u loaa u 0.1 wen acwf.Da ltack , J'ai..1

4114 aot v-.t to iltterfen.

?Illa pollcJ M7 bQe alao t.MD adopted

a.ec-• of tile mia••-t a,, l..1
1
Dd that a., 1968 lt wulcl nacuate
it• !orcu troa .W•.
belp tllem iatazveee

Tile coaceatratla. of tba

lll Mea.

l&JPtla troop• vouU

auaer would, t-.. . b• ale to wi.tch

•trateo • ._..r the " lOlll breath" fr• aorth to eout1'.

At th•

....

ti-.

Wa1M1 414 aot -t to ...... ..... ..., further ltecmae he f..nd •
l.,,C laa nprlNl mv. woul• burt Id.• coatr,.

Oil

*1 1 . .....r vened

laudi Al'Mi.a t.Mt &mt wou1d f.a\'ad• ... OCQIPJ part• of Seu41 Arabia
1D the

neat

tbat lf

of _, AATU•loa 1Dto T- tr• 1...a 1 terri.toq.

JN"k• ._, laa.dt

or lof•ll•t act1ou • &antua fore••

Be vaned

wo.U

••is•
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the Saucli Arabf.u town• of Qf.&an and lfajrn, which be claiMd wre once
part of Yemen ft4 tlleplly se1aed by Saudi force• th.1ny yHr• aao.
Wblle .. •••r vae tbreateataa, the Unttecl Stat•• llad beu trytna to
perauade both le4Mler• (P•i••l and •••••r) to return to th• eptrlt of the
compromiae that ha4 produce4 the Y...a peace pact the prevloua fall.I
Th• lgyptla adoptiOD of the "loea t>reath poU .cy" .ay have bee
motivated bJ the defeat• they bacl euffered ueder 1.oyali•t hand1 or by
tile "recopltloe that n ateaalYe area of iaecce11ibla tenaln without
effict..t co

mtcatlooa aad adllia tetrative n.tvork ... aest to

lapo•alble for a llaf.ted .-.r of trained Ma to coetrol."10

The policy

alao tllplted that l&YPt toreaav the hopel••••..• of a 11111tary victory
ower all of Y....a . 1 1
Pat..1 waa aware of tbeae thtag1 , aDd he vaa alao

avara

that

aa lona •• he held the pur••• the 1oJ•lf.1t• could llOt acc011p l lah ...ch
aad tbat tile offn•l•• ahould be del.,-.S m:atll a better opportalty
preallQt.. lteelf.

Therefore, raiaal vaa wllllaa to caaiproal••·

The

loyali•t• 11&at cooperate with the th1r4 fore• aD4 th• Sultana tmd Shleka
of ttae loutll Arabia Pe4•r•tloa, vbo were, lllte the tblrd force. at.l·
817Ptlaa.

Tile Ma probl•, althoup a aq&T•t• 1atu• fro11 th.a Y....-

coofllct, anenbel•••• i• a aicroco• of tu y_. altuatloa.

To wader•

etalld it• bipol'taac• ia tlae O'lerall T..al coafltct ,an ••laatloo of
clevelop11nt1 Sa Adu le W••.."1·
,......." Waru I• Will lnad• l f ,_., Inter.fer• ia T....,"

!!! Im !Wt, Ola7 2,
l'M.atre.t

1966) , P• 2.

w. v...t",

ll
J!!U. • P•

22,.

Jlof!D tw1u

ltll• lt66 , p. "'·

la

1139 oe port of Ada

1.i� of IAllf.J.

Later u.,

.. tile Men frot•torate.
Crow Coloa,.

Db e-.

lritl•la aatlaorl,l•• tU&
poeltlft ....na

Med..S .

capt•l"M bJ the lrttta !na

,,..

.wed iate tlMt lliateru.At wbicll

&be

New lmalwD

ID ltJ1, Ad.a ... tbe rrotec�rat• ..__. a
abGlllt
la

cb.-oup

tbe ruU...tioa • tile pan of th•

oder to retala � _. tlM Protectont•••

for th• cnatloa of lateraal peace _. .._ritJ

..,,..

'Illa '811o-Y••l tr•atJ ot frt..tnf.p la 1934 .... till• po•aittle.

'l'b• r..tot'atioa of puce la ICNtla Arabia ,,.. •&•hrW
1950'••

niutat.S Id.a clAS.

lw Alm••

ClftY Ma

ill

the late

ad dae ProtecstOl'atu,

_. • ld.Di.,..r �roka Od Mt1Mm bill _. t... lrttl•b tore.. 1D Ad•.
!Jae reaalt•

•w aoc

Maetit eldae-r •taaoai•t, IMlt

tc •u force dMa

aritleb •tboritt.. to onae a t•erati• la ltff. aalll 4dea _. tlua
hotectont• "" .,. called dae Soutla Arabia r..leratioa.

Aloas

wltb

dale cleYalo,...t , a -· rlallla llt•rat'J elite 1Naa co fona ta Adea.

They

""

DOt oqaiaed _. llaad little proapect of futm 1afW-..

Yet tbe)' aaltat• aacl "- to tenoriae tlae lritia •tboritie1 ill Ma,
_. tbe Bept..er 26, 1162 T--f. ...obatioa afforded tU. t'be opportualt7
to •• T-. u a bu• !or cralab'I for .-.enl•• ect•.
Wbea t.ba

lrittah audaorltle• created tile toutll .,_ h'aratloll ,

tbq 4ecland &Ut

tbeJ ...1• r•taia

Colo1a7 Welia1telJ.
tbe People' a
two

tlwatr

wa

acwenJ.pt7 ower

Ma

!be Wioulleta ill .._ CIMD HIM to IWCIUp al'OUDd

'fr.... UDi• Part1 aM

tbe Meo tT&4lae Ueioa 0G811'•• ·

partiea t.ored t•..•••c• _. .,.tual ..1t1 vltb Y-.

ID

'ftMt..
•

11•t
att..,t co n• cu rialaa rwol•ti.ar, tU., tb• arltt• aw•t
dec14.. to •rs• Ad• ColOll1 4lll4 tbe aw feduatloa iato OM atate.

U,..

tla1a -.w •••rae the

Mtloealiat• •'"' • (Wenll fedel'al

'!'bey
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l'LOIY (boat for tbe U..eratloa of loutb y_..) aa4 th•

llLf (Jlati.oul U.O.r•tloa ft.i) .

..ea11e

*"• tomK ... c¥..t.. ta

llac•••

..... to
it vi

iadep•d•c•
to

dte llLf

tlH

Wft

mite

...••r ,_. bi.a backSaa

ia HM ioaa or wdaar

witll

1'wa

to

fLOIY

OBCe

die JIU waa mn 4mMdtaa . _. lt• terrorut act 1.vl

ltec•••

mi:e pl'ftalat.

oil c
o
1
4•
t
.. '•ed

tt.oa ,

1919.

ac..n, &ant ta 1'67 •itch.eel it• hpport

w acld....S.

at W • lar.. !laacial eta• to tile ar...

n. lrltla ao'ffll

lt•

Tb• l&tt•r c-. 1Ato eaiateDC• I.a 1963

about

feT•iaa

..-laal f of tbe

pr...-e.

iat•re•t•,

lriuia �ecns

of the arnltJ of bet'

ID oN.r tlaat •"- Iii.Pt ...,•.s.ra aom fora of Latlueac• ill

lwtb uau. ll'itaia ••lar..

fore .. from Mea � 1961.
ot lta S...1 1.. fiaallt7.
of ..,.nat

�r•

produc•

Bovaver, wh11•

aM MiUle lat ell wu •ital to it• •OllOllJ•

ecllll
low edalaa laer

Gulf oll

t rlmpll .

1a 1K6 tlaat •• voul• vitlacltaw her

Tllia 4leclaratloa cw u a aurpd.M �•c•••
Tbe uU.ouli•t• were ..WUed 1D tllelr bovl'

MialJ ltecauaa of tb• ecowle dlUJ.aalti•• Ma

wo.14' fUMI ica•lf ta alter tbe lritiab 4eparture.13
.....I' r•Joicd

at

die ... .

Ad• _. &o.tb M:ala.

OD th• ot�r b&Dll ,

Ha Md loaa oppoMd •rlt1.ti pnaeace

Be •• 4eclare4 tbat

h• vu

ill

pnp&Te4 to •t.ay

lD

t- for tv•ty ,..ra if HM•aary, lmpl71a& tut ha ••• prepared

to

a--la la ,_

..

loag

..

tbe lritlab ware etat10IMl4 ia Aratt 1-Mt•.

ftaT vu aot ale to ...taia 't• poaitioa 1D South
bee••• of it• policJ of _._..tloa _.
oa tu otb•r aa.a.&, ti.. m.r ... a

ltec•••

41aeipU
.a..

party chat ballned eanaa•tl7 ill vio�e.

lt

,,..,

y.._

diaoqaised .

ad aipt117 oraal.sed

Mcodlaa to lt• Ueoloo.

,,

the llU 1>•11....S that Ylolaac• in th• att-.,t co will lDdependeac• wa1
a vital crit•l'ia ... ehoulct IN u...a •1•iaat .., •1-t oppo1.. to HLr
.._•• it .... vlolace •aatut the ITittab, the l•lt.. and

poll.cl••·
lhef.k8,

phJ .
power

_. CJtber utlwlt•t• who were la •teaar••=t •ilia it• pblloeo

•1 ....1, 1961 it 1'M rout.. ft.OIT ad

ta

..tatt.aa..

lt••lf •• tlHl oaly

Sonbena Anbt.a •1• to tall• G'rer •• tbe lrtttn clepart...

V.llke

rtOIT the

llU 4oetl aot eout•u ll•••u

_.

..
•••rl•

an

Accordtag to th•, ..•••r l• oaly

effeeti•• rall7iaa fOTce for Aral•.

another Arab leader ,.,.. iat•rut• ta South A.rota b aot ••lu.. lliply.
Tba Ad• pl'Obl•, like th•
daaa•rou• .

one

ta ,.._, wu eout,.rel pot•tt.ally

Tb• fact that lritala ad !ape were faetaa eaela otheT aad

cour•1illa their

.,...,.cti••

en

alll.. to taterfere with the pre•eoce of the

otber, cou14 1... to a coaholltat1oa ttee.e• tile two.

Altlaoualt th• Gaited

State• had ett..,t.. to .,,.., th• piroltl• ta loutb Ar
.. la with U..t f fereaca,
lt wou14 DOt have be• able to •iatala ta.at att it9de 11 a confrontation
betw.. tbe Ualt.. Al'D ...- i u Dd ll'ltata oenn-M.

The lo.let U.ton

woa14 th• hn• i.e• •llaed to ccae to the al• of tlae UAA

_. tb• '1-

..,_ llc, • inc• lt Md '-••t.. too be..,llJ la ltoth C4'1Dtrl•• to all• eucb
a

1-eac.mt Co M Jeo,a�lae4 .
"'9 a.,,cu. wltWT_.1 flt• the u•t•n nd aortlMara part• of

'!- ta tile UTlJ part of 1166 u...-.... tile loul •tlloTitl••·

Tiley wre

"-11!.at.. tato Hiq toned to ...,, tbe "1-a 1'natb poU.c7."

The

a.public_. had 1IOt �... too apfTeeUtb•• of l11PtfAa pnanee ... help.
Alao, then .,.re too _, �le• fl'om the ..,..11ca raaa ••.., ills die
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It wa• only in July ,

In it• report

1967 tlaat th• truth came out.
oa

tile

...

of poiaon gaa in Yemen, the InterDational

led Cro•• verified the rumor• ef the uae of poiaon gaa on Yeaen •• valid

In it• report, ,_llahN t.y the

truth.
July,

•w

!.2!:!

Tiu• on the 28th of

1967, the ICBC re,.n.. that the miaaiov. examined four aunivora

of the village of Gahar.
The four survi•o�• vile were in the contaminated area are
all in pain from their eye1 and almost b l ind.
in the cheat and noae laaa 9DJ wounda .

All have pains

The doctors caunot teetify t o an air raid with gaa bomb•
of which they vere not peTaoaally witne••·
On the other hand ,

y1clusion

they stress that all the evidence lead• to the c
edema wae caused by the breathing of poiaon ga1.

that

The United Stat.. Ila• pr..ioualy •oiced it• diaapproval over the
neva of the uae of poiaoa 1•• in Yemen.
that only lgypt poaaea1.. 1•• ch..icala.

It vaa clear froa the outaet
After the ICBC report , the

United State• State Depar
...t •pokeaman , Robert J. McCLoaky , declared
t
that ''we continue to iJe daeplf diaturbed by the many report• concerning
the uae of poiaon g.. agaillat civilian• in the Yemen.

Thia govermaent

condemn• auch action aa lahUlll&lle and entirely contrary to the law• of
nationa . 0

19

However , aa diaturbed as it vaa , the United State• did not

wiah to raiae the queation of the uae of gae in Yemen to the United
Rationa.

It felt that reapon• lbility ought to be handled by Saudi Arab ia.

However, S&lldi Arabia did not want to p�••• for international action
againat the United Arab Repub lic for it• uee of poiaon gaa becau1e the

lS"Text of the Red Crose Report on Uae of Poison Gas in
Yemen , " New York Tim.ta , (July 28 , 1967) , p. 8 .

!!!!

19 uus ia di•turbed l>y Yemen Report a of Poison Gas Uae,"
!2!! Times, (July 28, 1967), p. 1 .
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Arabs hacl reeeutly been defeated by Israel .

Jordan, Syria, and Egypt

had lo•t a portion of their territories to Iarael.

According to the

Saudi Arabian aovermaent , the attuation of the Araba at the time was
gra•e. Ivery effort had to be taken to aaaure some form of unity within
the Arab rank• ao that Israel would not be able to enjoy the fruit• of
it• victory.

To bring the issue of poiaon gae to the United l•tiona

would only anger the United Arab Republic aud negate whatever has been
accompliehed towards better understanding between the two nation•.
Jamil M. laroody, Saudi Arabian representative to the United •ationa ,
clarified hi• government ' • policy by stating that "in the inflamed
situation in the Kiddle !ast, this would not help mattera . " 20

Saudi

Arabia bad euggeated that a United Nations investigation team be sent to
Yemen to esaaine the al leged use of poison ga• .
did not undertake such a venture.

But the United Nations

At that t ime , the Arab-Israeli problem

was in need of immediate attention, and it was imperative for the United
Rations to concentrate its energy

on resolving the Arab-laraeli conflict,

which it viewed ae more dangerous to world peace than the Yemeni dil emna .
The l&YPt•in "failure in Yemen contributed to its shift from Bab
al•Handab to aharm al-Sheikh in an effort to bol•ter her preatige while
atmultaneoualy atrildag a blow against Ierael. "2 1

The defeat of Egypt by

the hand• of larael forced Naseer to aeek a disengagement from Yemen.
Militarily and economically, Egypt could not remain in Yemen.

It• Sinai

oil refinartea were taken over by I�rael and the Sues Canal waa closed.

Issue ."

Orbia,

!!! �

20"saudia, to Preserve Arab Unity, Won ' t Presa Poison Gaa
Times, (July 30, 1967) , p . 6.

21Aaron S .

Klieman, ''Bab al•Mandab:

(Fall, 1967) , p.

761.

The R·ed Sea in

Transition,"

58

Two of it• moat prised economic poeaeeaione were no longer under it•
Thia in itaelf ahattered the economic progre•• Eaypt had

control.
attained.

Militarily, it• army had been dealt a eevere setback, and it

had to reoraaniae aad atart abnoet anew in rebuildillg it.

Thia required

money and other nation• willing to help it regain loet revenuea.

There

fore, Saudi Arabia waa needed, vboae financial help had to be given.
The

UAR

knew full well that it would have to abdicate aomething in order

to receive from Saudi Arabia the eaeential financial backing it deaired,
hence the meeting between Paiaal and Naeaer at Khartoum in the Sudan.
The �artoua meeting between Paiaal and laaaer vaa another mile•
atone in Arab negotiation•.
expr••••d in Ih&Ttoum.

The Jeddah Agreement failed.

Hope was now

In the face o f defeat, the Araba wanted more

than anything elae to reconcile their difference•.

In �artoum, the

Bgyptian repreeentative auageated that the Jeddab agreement be revived .
Saudi Arabia wa• willing to go along with the euggeation.

They agreed

that a three power cOD1Dittee would be formed to euperviae the withdrawal
of the Bgyptian army from Yemen.

Faiaal in turn agreed to halt the

ailitary and financial aaabtance that he wa• giving the Royali•t•.
Morocco,

Iraq, and the Sudan were choaen to be the three nations named to

the auperviaory coaai ttee.
pro•Royali•t;

Aa a monarchi1t, Morocco waa preaumed to be

Iraq, a• a Republic, was pro- Repub lican;

and the Sudan,

aleo a republic, wa• preaumed to be navtral in the Yemen conflict.

Ho

date waa announced for the withdrawa l of Egyptian forces from Yemen.
However, Egypt waa willing to withdraw aa early aa po•aible.

The three

nation coanittee wa• alao responaible for the auparviaion of a plebiscite,
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which was to be taken once a ceaae fire was declared and honored .

The

reaaon faiaal did not ineiat on a preacribe4 date of the withdrawal of
the Egyptian army in Yemen was probably becauae "Faiaal is leas worried
about Naeaer and the UAR than he i• about Russian and Algerian penetra•
tion of Yemen .

Algerian aircraft have been eeen by neutral observer•

in that country and Preaident Houri Boumedienne . who atayed away from
the IChartoum meeting, wanta to eupplant Naaser •• the number one figure
in the Arab World. u

22

The �hartowa agreement waa not welcomed by Sallal, and he pro·
teated that the agreement vaa arranged over bis head.

23

Therefore, when

the peace mission arrived in Yemen , he refused to eee them.

The Royalist s ,

on their part , had misgiving• over the Egyptian intentioaa.

They felt

that Kaeser was not about to leave Yemen, just aa he did not do ao in
196 2 after the United State• recognized the Repub lic, in 196l, after
the United Nations diaengagement plan, and in 196S, after the Jeddah
agreesnent .

According to them, Raaaer wae just etalling for time ao that

he could recover from the defeat Iarael had inflicted on hi• nation. 24
Beedle•• to eay, a cease fire agreement was declared in November, 1967
after Sallal was deposed while on route to Moecov.
The ceaaa fire did not last long .

The aepub licana, fearing

Saudi Arabian enmity . asked the Soviet Union for help.

On November 24,

1967, twenty•four Miga arrived in Yemen along with Soviet technicians.

2s tanko Guldeacu, ''War and Peace in Yenan , " Queens Quarterly,
(AutUIDD , 1967) , PP• 483·484.
2

23
"over Their Head ,11 Economist, (October 14, 1967) , p .
24
stanko Guldeacu, .Q!. Cit. , p. 484.
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Thi• maneuver by the Republic heightened Royaliat fear•• and once again,
the ceaae fire wae broken.

Thia time. however, the Egyptian forces did

not take part in the action.

The Republican •TIDY had to defend it•

areaa, and its forty pilote trained in the Soviet Union were aufficient
to keep the Royali•t• at bay.
By the aiddle of December, 1967, the Egyptian troopa pulled out
of Yemen.

By coincidence this occurred only ten day• after the Britieb

troopa left Aden.

The !gyptiana, like the Britiah, aot out in good

order, but •• they left Hudeidah port, ualy battle• were being fought
between Royalieta and Republic.an•.

The fighting continued becauae Mr .

Noaaa n, probably the moat flexible of the Republican•, resigned.

He

atepped down becauae he wanted to negotiate through the three-nation peace
COllli
lll ttee appointed by the Arab leadera at Khartoum.
over by General Amri,

who

Hie place waa taken

waa not willing to abide by the decis ion of the

Khartoum agreement to hold a national plebiacite. 25

Neverthe leaa, the

Yemen dileuma can be said to have ended a• an international conflict pit·
t ing the traditionaliat Arabs against the revolutioniata.

As

aoon aa the

laat Egyptian aoldier left Yeme.n, the Yemeni conflict became, in all
practical purpose•. a civil war.
The overthrow of Sallal gave Yemen the opportunity to aeek peace ,
but the &epublican government rejected the chance.

The reaiguation of

Romaan made any form of compromi1e between the Iloyalieta and the
Republican• i.llp oaaible.

The new government resiated the tripartite

COIIli
ll aaion and rejected any form of negotiations either direct or indirect

p. 1135.

2.S"On Their OWD•·And Fighting, " Economist, (December 16, 1967) ,
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with the Hamid Eddin Family.

It took a dogmatic and unflinching ttand

to uphold the inte&rity of the Repub lic. 26

Thi• uncompromisin& position

by the new government forced the Royalbts to mobilize under PTiuce
Mohammed.
With the Egyptian army out of Yemen, the Royali•t• oelieved that
the time had &rTived for them to march into Sana.

On December 8 . 1967,

Prince }ibh8J11Ded wae reported to have given the Repub licans forty hours
to surrender Sana.

27

It waa alao reported that foreign mi••ionariee were

being evacuated from the city and that a curfew was illlpo eed ou the town.
Along with theee reports came the mo•t dieturbing new• item from the be·
leaguered Yemen.

A Ruaaian Kig- 17 fighter wae ahot down over Royali•t

territory and a Ru••ian pilot was captured.

Thia alarming new• wa•

aubatantiated by the United State• State Departmen t , and made Saudi
Arab ia feel uncomfortable about the Soviet presence in Yemen.

Thia was

the only incident in the Yemeni conflict in which a non•Arab government
personnel was captured by either of the two antagonist•.

Saudi Arabia

had cut off all military and financial aids to the Royalists by November,
thereby observing the terma of the Khartoum agreement.

But while it

obeerved the agreemen t , the Soviet Union, who had not been a party to
the agreement, wae replacing the United Arab Repub lic ' • military help
to the Repub lican regime .

Thi• led raieal to announce oo January 4th

that he would re•ume military help to the Royalists if the Soviet Union
did not halt its support of the Repub lic.

6o ana

2
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A. Schmidt , Yemen:

28

As for the Repub lican forces,

The Unknown !!! • p.

295.

27
"1.oyalieta Give Yemeni Regime 40 Houra to Surrender Sana , "
Time! , (December 8 , 1967) , p . C 3 .

28

Dana A. Schmidt._Qp. , C.!£..:. , p.

297.
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they defended Sana with confidence and zest.

San. had been under siege

ever since early December, and many had assumed that the Repub lican
government would collapee once the Egypt ian forcea were withdrawn.

On

the contrary, the Repub lic waa showing new vital ity and demonstrated
that it can stand on it• own feet given the necessary material and
economic aid.

In the meant ime , the Royalists were running out of

supp lies, and the failure of the Royalist forces in taking Sana had
been assigned to their poor logietical support .

S ince they had no air-

planes fer ·delivering arms , supplies or men to the arena of combat . they
had to rely on foot transport and the use of anima l s .

The harehnea1 and

severity of the terrain• did not make matters any easier.
important.

Time was most

The siege could not last for long because it drained the

resources and tried the patience of the Royalist force•.
tribes were aDXious to atorm the city,
rious to their farms and homes.
military help waa cut off,

The Royalist

so that they could return victo-

Because the Royaliat financial and

inevitably, after a month of siege, the

offeneive collapsed.

On February , 1968, Saudi Arabia resumed ita support of the
Roya lists.
fizzled.

However, the siege of Sana had failed, and the offensive had
Nevertheless,

the aid was needed.

According to Faiaal , Saudi

Arabia could not stand by while the Repub lican regime waa being assisted
by the Russ ians and lately by the Syriana.

29

It seemed that Paiaal was

being compelled to reauae his support of the Roya list•.

The initiat ive

of the Roya list offensive waned , and the Royalist family scattered.

29

11Faisal to Reaume Help to Yemenie , " New York Times ,
(February 29 , 1968) , p. AS.
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Al•Badr aat awaiting in Taif. Saudi Arabia, while other princes went to
Beirut, London , and Germany.
In 1968 the Repub lican governaent conaolidated it• poaition in
Yemen , attempting to bri.Jlg dissident tribe• under it• control.

With the

help of Rueaian economic and military asaiatanee and with the waning of
Boyaliat resistance, the Repub lic was meeting with aucceea.

-However ,

much to the dialike of the Soviet Union, the Republican re.giae lk>Ught to
reaume better relation• with the West.

They feared the leftiat •leeents

in the government and the army, who were, they suspected, plotting to
overthrow the government .

The Republicans bad juat recently witne�aed

the takeover of South Yemen by the leftist NLF , and they were appre•
he111ive that a leftist coup d ' etat may envelope them.

Therefore, the

government began to proaecute auapected leftista and moved closer to
eatabliahing better relatioft• with the Weit.

While Egypt , Syria, Iraq,

and South Yemen recogni�ed Eaat Germany in Auguat , 1968 , the Yemeni
llepub lic, on the other hand , gave it• recognition to West Germany ,
hoping auch action would lead to extensive West Gel"IDan aid.

lo

The

Republic waa anxious to approach the United State• in order to form
better relations with it.
In the meantime , the Royalist• had decided to deprive Imam al•

Badr o f all powers and leave him aa a mere figurehead .

Thay had aleo

begun , with the help of Saudi Arab ia, to prepare for another offenai•e
against the llepub lic.

Under General Amr i , t:he llepub lic underwent a

reorganization of ita ar� and prepared itself for the offenaive.

_!!!

30"After Years of Civil War, Yemen Seelll8 to be at Peace , "
� _T_ima_.._a , (August 4 , 1968) , p. 18M.

But
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when the offenaive started , it was not strong enough to achieve any
signif icant results.

A military stalemate then enaued . and by November ,
Al-Badr did not recognize the

1968, the Roya liats were split severely.

Royalist government ae constituted in June of the aame year.

The June

conference decided to form a new six-man Ima.mate Counc il with Prince
Mohammed aa its head.
armed forces.

Ke waa also

named

coanander-in-chief of all

The powers of al-Badr were taken away from him.

Upon

his rejection of the June conference, al-Badr declared himself Foreign
Minister and Premier of the Royalist government.
destroyed the Royalist reaistence.

The split nearly

Prince Mohammed, foreseeing the

danger of the split, rea igned the post of head of the Imamate Council so
that disunity in the ranka of the Royalists might be averted.

But this

split so shattered the prestige and influence of the Royalists that they
were unab le to rally anti-Repub lican elements into a fighting force as on
previous occasions.

Their disappearance ae a formidable force brought

relative peace and harmony into Yemen.

The Repub lic, ae a moderate

government , could now decide on the future of Yemen.
of the war have not healed as of yet,

S ince the wounds

it is inconceivab le that a

Republican Yemen can last without it• earnest attempt• to heal the wounds.
This can only be done by the inclusion of Royalists into the government
and into the affairs of Yemen.
tragic.

The suffering of Yemen has been long and

Now that outside interventions have withered away , the Repub lic

of Yemen needs to permit the return of Yemeni refugees , who had fled the
country to save their life and fight for what they considered legitamacy .
More than 100, 000 Yemeni lives were lost during the conflict.

Indeed,

that is too high a figure for Yemen to forget, unless poaitive measures
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are taken to insure a better and more prosperoue future for all Yemenis.

C H A P T E R

VI

C O B C L U S I O N

CONCWS ION
The Yemeni Civil War was a teating ground for outaide forces
of conflicting ideologies.

On

the one hand , stood Egypt , whose plat·

form of Arab Socialism marked it as the apotheosis of Arab revolutionaries
and progreasiv.iam.

Its function was to help the Yemen Republic maintain

itself and to eradicate the remnants of the past.

On

the other hand , stood

Saudi Arabia, whose adherence to Islamic laws and traditions forced it to
come to the defense of the Imamate dynasty and the statue quo.

Saudi

Arabia, as well as Great Britain, Jordan, and Iran shared a dislike for
Nasser ' s progreasiviat ·tendencies, while the revolutionary regimes in the
Arab world gave their unresolved support of Egyptian incursions into Yemen.
The power game brought the conflicting forces into direct physical conflict
because Egypt ' s military intervention forced the issue.
Why did Nasser undertake the responsibility of sending his troops
into Yemen?

The answer is too difficult to postulate.

several reasons which are aub1tantive and conclusive.

But there are
First, Nasser ' s

venture into Yemen may have been influenced by his strong belief in
securing a pan·Arab nation under the direction and guidance of Cairo.
He had long recognized the importance of the peninsula geographically and
economically.

In his book, '.l"he Philosophy � !h.! Revolution, he asserted

that the Arab land occupies an important strategic position in the map of
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the world and i t i a a croaaroada of the world. l

It i a also a land, be

contended , rich in oil, "oil which is considered the backbone of
material civilization, and without which all the world ' • largest factoriea, all means of land , aea and air c0111DUnication, all war weapons , be
they fighter• and bomber• flying high above the cloud• or the submarines
diving deep into the unfathomab le depths of the oceana , would become
mere iron b locka , devoid of motive powe r . " 2

Because the Arab world

posaeaaee vast .-ount• of oil, it ia "etrong- -atrong not through wailing,
ahouting or appealing for help at the top of our voicea, but atrong
through our compoaure, or our correct estimation, aupported by figures ,
of our capacity to work , aad our true uuderatanding of the strength of
tie• that bind our people• together, those tie• which .ake our homeland
aa

integral and indivisible whole, which ahould be defended aa aucb and

not aa an isolated unit . " 3
Nasser'• recognition o f the economic and a•ographic atrength of
the Arab world led him to rebuke thoae regiaee attached and dependent
upou the "1.aperialbta" nation• for capital and know•how.

He ached to

aee hierarchi81D and the dependency on foreign capital diaaipate, hence,
his continuoue verbal attack• in the 1950 ' • and 1960 ' • on thoae ariato•
cratic regiaea in the Arab world.

The Yemeni revolution, henceforth,

afforded him the opportunity to coae to the aid of a fellow revolut ionary
regime and atem the tide o f reaiatance to it.

I!!!
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1cwl Abdel Nasser,
Philo1ophy
(Rational Pub li•hina Bouse Pres a , 1963), p. 66.
21bid . , pp. 66-67.
3Ibid.
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Revolution,
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In Yemen he came face to face with traditionali•t Saudi Arabia
mid colonialiat Great Britain.

Here hi• atrategy of destroying

colonial iem and atriviog to eliminate tradit ionaliam in the Arab
peninsula wat initiated.
The mainteaance of the Yemeni Republic wae Ra•eer ' • ae.cond
reaaon fot bis venture.

It waa important be.cauae , once the life of the

Repub lic waa achieved , Naaaer ' a attention could awing north and South.
Be could then manipulate the overthrow of the Saud Family in Saudi Arab i a ,

and by fermenting riot a.ad rebellion i n Aden he could make the Britiah look
for a haaty exit from its colonial posseasion.

Strategically, he would

become the power in the peain•ula, and thia would enable him to aerve as
the rallying point to ouat American and British investment• in the area.
Jirat, however, the Royali•t• had to be annihilated.

When they did not

auccomb gent ly, be resorted to the uae of poison gae.
reaiatance to hia acheme frustrated his plaua.
viewed i t , waa on hia aide.
aula.

Nevertheleaa, time, aa he

Moderniam waa making inroad• into the penin

He wae willing to stay ae long aa posaible.

were only temporary.

Saudi Arab ia ' •

Military setbacks

The easence of the matter wae his presence in Yemen.

A• long as hie force• were there, the element• of "react ion" and colonial-

1..

would eventually be de•troyed.

Therefore, while Egypt wa1 forced to

agree to attend neaotiat ing conferences after llli litary reverie• ,

it did ao

to graap at a chance to regroup ita force• and reeuae it• atrategy to k i l l ,
capture,

or expell the Imam and end Roya list reaiatance.

to diaengage from Yemen were aade reluctantly.

Hi• agreements

Hi• preatige and the

integrity of hie poait ion could not be comp�Ollli sed by either military
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eetback• in Yemen or political preaeures from the United State• and the
United Nation•.

Be justified hie presence in Yemen as a moral duty made

by Egypt to a sister-Arab nation.
Saudi Arab ia, by neceesity, adopted a defeneive posture against
Egyptian military intervention in Yemen.

Its military and economic

a1si1tance to the Royali•t• were sufficient to stifle the Egyptian inter•
vention.

Even Faisa l ' s attempt to create an Islamic alignment was

defensive in essence.

Its failure to emerge was due to lack of enthusi

asm on the part of conservative Moslem regimes he visited for a confron
tation with Nasser.
The virtual destruction of the Egyptian armed forces in June,
1967 by Israel made it impossible for Nasser to maintain his expeditionary
force in Yemen.

This is the turning point of the conflict.

However, the

vacuum left by hie forces was fil led by the Soviet Union, whoae military
and economic assistance to the Repub lic made possible the preservation of
the Repub lican regime.

This regime now demonstrated it could withstand

the Royalists on it• own .

It had matured.

In retrospec t , the Egyptian military intervent ion in Yemen was
a success in its limited goals.

The British forces were forced to

evacuate from Aden and the Protectorate under strong opposition fro� the
Nationalist Adanese, the Repub lic was maintained, the Royalists diss ipated,
and Saudi Arabia reformed its political, economic , and social institut ions .
However,

in perspective, Egypt has failed to destroy tradit iona lism and

rid the peninsula of its dependence on foreign capital.

Saudi Arabia is

a reformed society, but one which still funct ions under Islamic laws and
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traditions.

But, the balance of power had, once again, been 1wung in

favor of the revolutionary regime1.
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